# The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

# This Month's Cover

IN THE NORMANDY INVASION, the plans of the 508th Parachute Infantry were knocked into a cocked hat before any of its men had touched the ground. Carrier formations were scattered by cloudbanks and heavy flak; only one battalion was dropped at the proper time and place. The people of this battalion were to remain isolated for four decisive days despite their best efforts. Their story begins on page 8.

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


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

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


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# Passing in Review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

**The Betio Beachhead . . .**

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA—Capt James R. Stockman, USMC. 86 pages, illustrated. Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

It is truthfully said that no one man can tell the story of a battle. This applies to every participant, from the general in command to the private in the ranks. No one man can see more than a limited portion of the action. Capt Stockman in *The Battle for Tarawa* has told the story of this battle well. He has drawn his information from official records and from personal interviews with many of the key participants.

The account begins with a discussion of the strategic situation in the Pacific and the importance of the Gilbert Islands. It takes up the plans of CinCPac for the Galvanic Operation (Capture of the Gilbert Islands), the task organizations and plans for the Longsuit-Boxcloth (Tarawa-Apamama) operations.

It follows with a description of the atolls and Betio; an account of the Japanese occupation, their defenses and plans for countermeasures in case of attack. The effect of the Rabaul air strikes and the Bougainville landing on the general strategic situation is evaluated. The rehearsals and approach are related followed by a day to day account of the progress of the battle. The actions of the various combat teams and key individuals are dramatically described.

The reader is impressed with the uncertainties of the battle, carried on with stark heroism, grim determination, in apparent confusion, yet adhering to a definite unchanging plan of action. Radios fail, communication breaks down, orders do not get through. Yet in spite of difficulties, each combat, supply and administrative unit carries out the duties for which it was trained. Order evolves out of chaos, and victory is finally achieved against apparently insurmountable odds.

The taking of Apamama is described, as is the reconnaissance of the other islands of the Gilbert group.

The conclusion evaluates Tarawa in the light of later amphibious operations in the Central Pacific.

The decision to take the Gilbert Islands emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task organizations, their respective missions and the timing of the operation were determined by CinCPac, who also made the decision to take Betio and then occupy the remainder of the atoll of Tarawa.

Whether to begin an offensive with the means at hand or to wait for more and better equipment; whether to take the risk of a frontal assault, or the risk of enemy countermeasures incident to a more time consuming method, are decisions typical of the responsibilities that must be assumed by the High Command in war.

When Galvanic was planned there was a Japanese fleet in being, which in number of ships, planes, and gunpower was the equal of the United States Fleet in the Pacific. Based in the Mandated Islands were hostile surface craft, submarines, and land based aircraft capable of striking any force attacking the Gilberts within three days of its discovery. The probable damage to be expected from a combined attack on the transport group had to be weighted against the probable losses of a direct assault on Betio, as compared to those to be expected if landings were made first on other islands of the Tarawa atoll.

The successful air strikes on Rabaul and the landing of Marines on Bougainville in November lessened to a marked degree the danger of a counterattack by the Japanese naval forces. But even if their results had been evaluated at the time, they came too late to affect the plans for the capture of Tarawa.

Another controversial point covered is the question of the tide. The first reports indicated that the troop commanders were taken completely unawares by the lack of sufficient water over the reefs to float the landing boats. As a matter of fact they were disappointed but not surprised. The possibility of insufficient water on the reef to float landing boats was considered from the beginning. Experiments were immediately begun with amphibian tractors as troop carriers, and every available one for which transportation could be obtained was sent to the 2d Division and used in the landing. Three times the 125 available could have been used with profit.

With the assigned mission of "Taking Betio and then occupying the remainder of the atoll" the 2d Division took over the responsibility for the assault. With one complete combat team in Corps reserve, Division estimates of the situation and plans had to be made on the basis of employing the two combat teams under its control. This led to the decision to use one combat team plus one

battalion in the assault and hold one combat team less a battalion in Division reserve. Lack of troops precluded the landing of a battalion on Bairiki simultaneously with the landing on Betio.

The decision to attack from the north was based largely on the shape of the island which made the northern beach generally a salient, less subject to enfilade fire than the southern beach, which formed a reentrant. Attack from the west was discarded because of bad landing conditions and the narrow frontage which would have restricted the number of troops that could be used in the assault. The pier running across the reef to deep water in the lagoon, offering some protection to troops crossing the reef and affording means of getting supplies ashore, was an additional reason for using the northern beaches.

The object of the order to the 8th Marines, less two battalions, on the evening of D-day to land on the eastern end of Betio, was to forestall a counterattack from that direction, which if successful would have had disastrous results. The failure of the order to reach Col Hall was offset by the failure of the Japanese to counterattack at this critical time. The slow but steady progress of the troops on Red Beaches 2 and 3 plus the growing importance of the pier as a route of supply and evacuation led to the change in Col Hall's orders and his landing in that sector on D+1.

The relation of the subsequent events of the battle covers the employment of the 6th Marines, after its release by Corps to Division control, the Japanese counterattack, the taking of Betio, and the conquest of the atoll.

The book shows clearly the pressing need for more reliable means of communication and greatly increased close-in fire support to troops approaching the beach. Both of these needs were well known at the time but were impossible of fulfilment because of the lack of proper type radios and shallow draft fire support craft.

The book contains excellent maps and is well illustrated with action photographs.

The appendices include a bibliography showing the book to be well documented. They show the United States task organizations and list the casualties, both American and Japanese. Corps and Division orders (without appendices) might well have been included.

Failure to include the 2d Medical Battalion in the organization of the 2d Division is sufficiently serious to warrant the printing and issuing of a correction. The units of the Medical Battalion were attached to the respective combat teams. All were employed during the action, rendering invaluable service, saving many lives and suffering a high proportion of casualties.

All in all *The Battle For Tarawa* is a splendid unbiased complete account of a critical battle of World War II, which to quote Adm Nimitz, "knocked down the door to the Japanese defenses in the Central Pacific."





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It will be invaluable to the military and naval student of amphibious warfare. Its simple non-technical language presents a clear and interesting picture of a battle as actually fought which will hold the interest of the lay reader.

It is a good book, well written. A copy should be in every marine's library.

Julian C. Smith
LtGen, USMC (Ret'd)

**War Afloat . . .**

ADMIRAL HALSEY'S STORY — FleetAdm William F. Halsey, USN. 310 pages, illustrated. Whittlesey House. $4.00

When, in October, 1942, RearAdm William F. Halsey was directed to take command of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific force without prior notice, he was presented with all the ingredients for a national military disaster. Our naval forces in the Solomons were inferior to those of the Japanese in numbers, in position, and in support. Our ground effort in Guadalcanal, denied the certain life line upon which every amphibious attack is so dependent, was hanging on by its very fingernails. Personnel—the sailors and the marines involved, were aware of the gravity of the situation. Its grimness showed in their every act—and there was more than a little defeatism to be found. It took William F. Halsey exactly 24 hours to modify the entire aspect of the South Pacific situation—without the receipt of one additional ship or plane or case of rations. The electric effect of his presence on the men faced with fighting the grim battle there was so widespread and infectious that in the minds of all it was merely a matter of time until the Japs were whipped in the South Pacific.

This is a measure of the character of the Adm Halsey who has honestly set down his reflections in a candid self-effacing volume, which touches briefly on his early life, demonstrates his growing appreciation of the effect of air power on naval operations, and the great significance of the aircraft carrier; and proceeds finally to a factual account of the Admiral's own tremendous part in the winning of the great Pacific War.

Readers who are familiar with Adm Halsey's personality may be apprehensive that his well-known candid characteristic of speaking his mind precisely as he actually feels may be subdued in this book. They need have no such fear. His own deep personal convictions have been subject to no camouflage—and apparently little restraint; his genuine admiration for Gen MacArthur, his mistrust of Gen Kenney and his boundless admiration for Marines are all clearly reflected in the volume. It is, in addition, supplied with interesting side lights in the form of footnotes by members of the Admiral's staff, interjected from time to time to give the book additional realism. VHK

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# GAZETTE

FEBRUARY 1948

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## This Month and Next

NEXT MONTH the GAZETTE is very proud to be able to publish *Scientific Advances and Future Wars* by MAJ GEN J. F. C. FULLER, who is probably Britain's best known military analyst and writer.

Two articles, *Future Secured* and *How Well Do You Know Your Landing Craft?*, which would have appeared this month have been postponed until March because of the last minute scheduling of COL S. L. A. MARSHALL'S *Affair at Hill 30.* Next month will also see the second and concluding installment of Col Marshall's narrative of a parachute operations in Normandy.

In line with the employment of landing craft, LTCOL L. C. HUDSON asks *Why Not DUKWs?* Accordng to LtCol Hudson both war and postwar landing experiences indicate that the DUKW is a relatively neglected form of amphibious transportation.

The Iwo Jima Operation gets a thorough review in the next installment of FLETCHER PRATT'S *The Marines in the Pacific War.* Incidentally, Mr Pratt's history is now available in book form, entitled *The Marines' War.*

Also scheduled is *Amphibious Armor* by MAJ ANGUS M. FRASER which discusses the employment of an armored force in future beachhead operations.

MSGT ROGER M. EMMONS returns with another of his excellent portrayals of shipboard action. This time it is *Tarawa Bombardment.*

# Affair at Hill 30

By Col S. L. A. Marshall

OF ALL OUR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN Theater, no one chapter is more instructive than the experience of 3d Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry, during the Normandy invasion. For with that unit, all went well in the beginning, yet in the end fortune's smile turned to a frown, and the aggressive and frequently inspired efforts of the battalion's leaders were thwarted of any great achievement. It is therefore a case study of the trial and adversity which are peculiar to airborne combat.

The general mission of 508th was to gain control of the strategic ground in the angle where the Merderet and Douve Rivers joined. The Douve bridge at Etienville was to be destroyed as a defensive measure, while offensively the regiment was to seize the causeway crossings of the lower Merderet, thus to serve the main body of VII Corps in its advance westward from Utah Beach to cut the Cotentin Peninsula and isolate Cherbourg.

There were two Merderet crossings, approximately two miles apart, the northern one being at La Fiere, the southern at Chef du Pont. The latter was the main crossing, providing ingress to a much wider and more decisive area. It was therefore the principal concern of the regiment.

Accordingly, it was planned that the 508th, being dropped west of the Merderet and north of the Douve, would rendezvous on Hill 30, a steeply rising and orchard-crowned hill which commanded the Chef du Pont causeway at a distance of about one mile.

This plan was frustrated by the conditions of the drop two hours past midnight. The carrier formation became scattered, in part because of the cloudy night, in part because many of the planes, disregarding orders, took evasive action to avoid a moderately heavy flak. In

**Help appeared to come at the most propitious moment; a glider dropped out of the night onto the field. Instead of reinforcements or heavy weapons they found only a pilot and a baby bulldozer.**

consequence, most of the regiment was dropped on the wrong side of the river, and northward of the north crossing. The regimental commander, Col Leroy Lindquist, thereon set himself to the task of collecting a part of his scattered force from out of the marshes which abound the Merderet, and proceeding to his nearest objective—La Fiere.

By strange irony this undid the careful work of the only part of the carrier formation which had served the regiment well. The serial carrying the 3d Battalion had missed the cloudbank and ignored the ground fire. It flew undeviatingly on toward the drop zone, just northward of the village of Picauville, and its sticks unloaded at about the proper second. So doing, they dropped into ground where, despite their best effort, they were to remain isolated during the four decisive days when the airborne forces were laying a carpet for VII Corps into the heart of Cotentin.

But the battalion's people were still unoriented when they came to earth. Its commander, a youthful West Pointer, LtCol J. B. Shanley, had noted during his descent that the bundle light had dropped with the speed of a rock. He knew that its chute had failed to open. Still feeling his disappointment as he shook loose from his harness, he looked about him and saw the light gleaming in the distance. Making his way to it, he found that everything else in the bundle had been smashed to bits, but by some miracle the light had survived the fall undamaged. Eight of his men were already gathered around it when he got there. It was decided that the ground was too low to be conspicuous. The party moved out looking for a hill, and when they found it, Shanley affixed the beacon to the top limb of the tallest tree, and then tied flashlights to other branches, until it began to glow like a Christmas tree.

Now about thirty men had come to the light. Shanley took his original party and organized them into an all-around defense of two fields, covered only by their hand

**Part I: The 3d Battalion dropped where, despite their best efforts, they were to be isolated for four days. All went well in the beginning, yet in the end, their aggressive and sometimes inspired leadership seemed to be thwarted**

Although *The Affair at Hill 30* is Col S. L. A. Marshall's first contribution to a Marine Corps publication, the Colonel has had certain tenuous and intermittent connections with the Corps over a period of thirty years — these connections having been staged in such diverse locales as France, Central America, and the Central Pacific.

Presently editorial writer and military critic for the DETROIT NEWS, S. L. A. Marshall has been in, around, or writing about war during much of his adult life. Concerning this, he say:

"I personally cringe at any mention of decorations in a biographical sketch and I would prefer that this kind of detail be skipped. However, it has some relevance that in the two wars I have participated in twelve major operations, and under such circumstances that I was working at battalion command posts or forward thereof. It is usually assumed that an historian works from a billet at Army Headquarters, but that was not my role, inasmuch as combat coverage was my chief personal interest.

"It may also be pertinent that, as a war correspondent, I was in Spain during the Civil War, in Nicaragua during the Sandino period, and in Mexico during three minor revolutions."

More specifically, Col Marshall enlisted for World War I at the age of 17; as an infantry lieutenant, he was overseas for two years, participated in Soissons, St Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Ypres-Lys campaigns, and served with the Army of Occupation. Re-entering the military service in the summer of 1942, he was first a civilian consultant to the Secretary of War, then, three months later, commissioned major and assigned as Chief of Orientation for AUS. As such, he wrote the basic national policy concerning Americans of Japanese blood. In August, 1943, he was transferred to the newly-formed Historical Section, War Department General Staff, where his first job was to organize the secret operational narrative of Doolittle's Tokyo raid. In October of the same year, he was sent to the Central Pacific with the mission of developing methods of battlefield research which were to become standing operating procedure for all Army historical personnel in all theaters. In pursuit of this mission, he landed with the 27th Division at Makin and accompanied the 7th Division in the Kwajalein operation.

At the time of the Normandy invasion, Col Marshall was transferred to the European Theater, and from Normandy forward undertook personal coverage of all airborne campaigns. Late in 1944, he was named Deputy Theater Historian, and in April of the following year became Theater Historian. In the ETO, he participated in the following campaigns and battles: Normandy, Brittany, Siege of Brest, Arnhem, the Ardennes, the Ruhr encirclement, and Eastern Germany.

In December, 1945, Col Marshall returned to the United States, and was released from active duty the following May. He still serves, however, as a member of the War Department's Historical Advisory Commission.

For many years, there has been a close connection between the Colonel and the dean of British military authors, MajGen J. F. C. Fuller (whose important article on future warfare will appear in the March GAZETTE.) Regarded as Gen Fuller's chief interpreter in this country, Col Marshall devoted most of his early technical writing to armor and defense against armor, and, he says, simply built on Gen Fuller's ideas. The prophetic qualities of Gen Fuller's (*and* Col Marshall's) ideas about armor were graphically demonstrated in World War II: while both Fuller and Marshall had been largely discounted in their own countries, the Germans and Russians had received their sermons on armor with considerable interest, and, when the war came, put many of these to practical test.

Col Marshall's published books are *Blitzkrieg, Armies on Wheels, Island Victory, Command, Bastogne, Makin,* and *Men Against Fire.* His *Normandy Airborne* is in the mill. Additionally, he has written several military manuals for the Army (*Short Guide to North Africa, Short Guide to New Caledonia, Short Guide to Burma,* etc.) and many articles for various military and professional journals.

He feels that the system of comprehensive tactical interrogation of the enemy high commanders and general staff, which he instituted in Europe, will "in the long run, probably pay bigger dividends than any of the small contributions which I have made to the growth of knowledge about operations."

weapons. The remainder of his force he divided into five patrols and sent them forth to round up additional men. Each party was sent out on an azimuth or toward a specific hill or cluster of farm buildings with instructions that it would return to the position at a designated hour. As additional men were brought into the ground, they were distributed around the bordering hedgerows.

Of heavier weapons, the patrols were able to retrieve only one machine gun. But help appeared to come to them at the most propitious moment; a glider appeared out of the night and came to rest in one of the two fields. They had watched its descent breathlessly after the C-47 which had it in tow had exploded directly over their heads. Now they rushed to it, hoping that it would contain either heavy weapons or reinforcements. But inside it were only the pilot and his cargo—a baby bulldozer, than which Shanley needed nothing less. The pilot picked up a carbine and joined the defense.

One patrol got back with word that it had reconnoitered the fringes of a nearby village which it took to be Picauville. Shanley, still uncertain of his position in relation to the drop zone, went the way the patrol had gone, took a bearing on a church steeple, and satisfied himself that he was standing on just about the right ground. On his return to the position, he happened upon two bundles, one of which supplied him with a bazooka and the other with an SCR 300.

During all of this time, there was a German force of three infantry companies, one battery of artillery, and four tanks within Picauville. They were alert to what was occurring. In fact, they had already killed outright a number of paratroopers who had dropped right into the bivouac area, and a few others had scrambled out of their clutches to safety. But while the dark lasted, they made not the slightest move against the forces assembling without, reacting as if they were paralyzed by fear. This was not unusual. In fact, there is not a single

**Patrols cut all the wires in the vicinity and learned from Frenchmen that the Germans had at least a battalion of men at Picauville and a stronger force in dug in positions covering Etienville.**

example of German troops acting counteroffensively against our airborne forces that first night, though opportunities were numerous.

As first light began to break, the position drew a scattering small arms fire from the southward. It appeared to Shanley that this first contact came of enemy patrols punching in to feel his location. He judged that their nearest men were two fields away but he couldn't get a clear idea of what was going on. So in the interest of conserving his scant ammunition supply, he ordered his men to fire only when they saw a live target, which was seldom. In this desultory manner, the action wore on for several hours, the enemy failing to press his advantage, and Shanley waiting and hoping to raise more strength before risking a full engagement.

Around mid-morning, the enemy skirmishers began to press down along the hedgerows and a well-directed fire fell on the American dug-in positions from well over on the left flank. At about this same time a friendly voice came over the SCR 300. Lt Norman McVicar had assembled about sixty men in a field approximately one mile northeast of Shanley. One of Shanley's patrols had strayed into McVicar's position, and McVicar at once set about raising Shanley on his own set. Shanley told McVicar to hold where he was, and that he—Shanley—would forthwith move to him.

By 1200 the arrangements for this movement were complete and Shanley was ready to give the order, hastening because he had noted that the enemy advance was now being extended around both flanks. But at the last moment he had to hold his hand. Approaching his left front, crouching low next the hedgerows, and apparently unaware of his presence, he saw another party of Americans. Shanley sung out to his men to direct all of their fire to the left, figuring that he could pin the Germans on that side, and that under that cover the friendly patrol could enter his lines. Instead, as he opened fire, the patrol returned it with all weapons, and two of his men were hit at the first volley. There was a quick waving of orange flags from within Shanley's






lines, and the patrol, getting the friendly signal, came into the field at a run. It had been sent out on a general scouting mission by yet a third group of 508th men under command of Maj Shields Warren, Jr., which was in motion not far from McVicar.

The concentration of fire toward the left in order to cover the patrol had had the unanticipated effect of cooling the advance along that flank and Shanley decided on the spur of the moment to make his withdrawal in that direction. That would pull him away from his assigned task—the blowing of the Douve bridge at Etienville—but his force was small and he hoped that by joining the McVicar and Warren groups, he might pick up heavy weapons and explosives.

So the force started on its way, leaving behind ten of its number and one medical officer, all of whom had been either crippled in the jump or wounded during the action. They were dead weight and would have encumbered the party; the doctor was left behind to surrender them to the enemy.

Not until the moment of their stepping out was it seen that the glider, on settling to earth during the night, had blocked their only rearward exit from the two fields. Elsewhere on the left and rear boundaries the hedgerows and embankments rose solidly. The growth was much too thick for there to be any thought of going through it. The glider was far too heavy to be moved. Shanley saw that the only escape was through the glider. One man at a time, they would have to run for it, climb into the door on one side, work around the bulldozer, and exit on the other side. It entailed a terrible delay at the very time it was necessary to move fast. The minutes dragged out. The force was halfway through this weird defile before the enemy discovered what was happening and concentrated fire on the glider. Then the trickle of men stopped and Shanley went back through the glider to see what was the cause. He found that the remaining men had formed a fire line inside the hedgerow and had abandoned all idea of trying to make the glider passage. He booted them hard and told them that they had to go.

SEVERAL OF THEM STARTED, the rest showed signs of following, and so he went along. But a few of the men from this hesitant rear guard were never seen again, and whether they quit in the field or were shot going through the glider could not be learned. The enemy made no further attempt to rush the withdrawal. The column moved along under cover of the hedgerows to a point about 800 yards east of Picauville. There it was stopped short by the spectacle of 200 paratroopers sitting together in an open field doing absolutely nothing. No one had taken command. No orders had been given. So this considerable body of men had merely marked time for many hours waiting for someone to happen along and tell them how to get started. Shanley now divided his total force into three platoons, moved it to a promising hilltop and set up an all-around defense. He figured he now had enough man-power, but for the rest of it, he had added a caliber .50 and three caliber .30 machine guns to his strength, and still lacked explosives.

The time had come when he had to know what he would be up against if he pushed eastward to the Douve bridge. Four patrols were sent out, two to cut all wires in the vicinity, the others to round up Frenchmen for information. They got what they went after. The Frenchmen said that there was "at least a battalion" of the enemy deployed around Picauville and a "much stronger" force in dug-in positions covering Etienville. It was still early evening and Shanley's own force was continuing to build up. The Warren and McVicar groups had found one another, and after a brief brush with enemy skirmishers, had entered Shanley's lines. Even so, he doubted that he was strong enough to move eastward. He had not made radio contact with either the regiment or the other battalions and from the shreds of information supplied by the men he concluded that the drop had scattered the regiment far and wide and that there were no American forces to west of Etienville. This, as all subsequent information proved, was a wholly correct estimate and it prompted an ineluctable decision—that he should proceed toward the only mission encharged 508th which remained within his means, advancing to the high ground overlooking the Merderet and the Chef du Pont causeway.

> *"Sixty per cent of the art of command is the ability to anticipate. Forty per cent of the art of command is the ability to improvise, to reject the preconceived idea that has been tested and proved wrong in the crucible of operations, and to rule by action instead of acting by rules."*
>
> —Col S. L. A. Marshall

At 2100 he organized his force into two companies, with Warren leading one and himself the other. In a two-hour march they got to Hill 30 without incident. It was ground that looked fairly promising on the map. From the hillcrest there should have been a commanding view of the valley, the causeways and the town of Chef du Pont on the far side. But the reality of the terrain belied the promise of the map. Hill 30 was criss-crossed by hedgerows of a particularly obtrusive sort. They were high banked and thickly sown with tall shade trees. The road which wound to the top of the hill was a deep-rutted track of mud between steep banks. From the top of Hill 30, one had no sense of being on elevated ground because it was almost impossible to see beyond the first fences. It was a favorable place for rendezvous,

for it was plainly marked and had sufficient cover. But when the trees were in leaf, it commanded nothing.

That night Shanley roughly shaped a position which he proceeded to fully coordinate on the following morning. His own company was formed in a crescent around the northern slope of Hill 30 and Warren's was deployed so as to cover the approaches from the south. Thus disposed, Shanley's line was facing toward La Fiere and Ste Mere Eglise where only a few miles distant the battle crises of the 82d Airborne Division were at this time occurring. Yet of this fighting he could hear no sound, and his efforts to raise any higher headquarters by radio were vain. For all the battalion knew, it had become a beleaguered outpost of an invasion which had failed. Yet this sense of isolation had not begun to depress unduly the spirits of the men. Their own affairs had gone reasonably well and they had suffered no real hardship.

The night was uneventful. On the second morning patrols were sent out to look for supply bundles and to clear the immediate area of any enemy forces. Another group of strays from the battalion came into the position, bringing three machine guns. This augmentation of strength encouraged him to think of fresh enterprises, the opportunity for which was already at hand. By radio, he had heard that a friendly group on the far side of the Merderet had brought the Chef du Pont end of the causeway under control. All that he knew was that it was an American force of unknown size; more than that could not be put on the air. But as aid to them, and as additional protection for himself, he decided to throw a roadblock across the highway running parallel to the Douve south of Hill 30. The block would face both ways, opposing enemy forces attempting to move east across the mile-long causeway, or coming against Hill 30 from either direction.

For it is to be noted that even after the block was put into position that evening, 82d Division still did not have command of the southern bridgehead. Halfway across the marsh the causeway from Chef du Pont branched, its lower arm extending south into enemy territory around Beuzeville la Bastille and Montessy, on both sides of the Douve River. There was enough tree cover along the causeway that enemy skirmishers from these areas could still move back and forth from the solid ground to the trunk of the upper causeway which the Americans were attacking from both ends. The balance of forces was such that neither side was strong enough to dislodge the other, thereby bringing the causeway under control.

That one consequence of this unique deadlock was to confuse American thinking as to whether the attitude toward the crossing should be offensive or defensive was perhaps natural enough. Shanley, sitting on the west bank, had already made up his mind. He was camped on the far side of a decisive bridgehead, and there he had

LtCol Shanley's position at the initial assembly and withdrawal.



**Heavy mortar fire doused the top of Hill 30 while skirmishers harassed the outpost with small arms.**

to stay, since if he advanced to the high side, the ground might not be re-won again. While acting defensively, he was thinking offensively; to cut the crossing would defeat the prime purpose of his force. On the other hand, the forces on the east bank, having been badly mauled by the enemy on the first day, wanted now to blow the Merderet bridge to keep the Germans from surging back. There was one exception. A member of the battalion, 2dLt Francis J. Bolger, having been dropped on the wrong side of the river, had joined the force at Chef du Pont. Hearing a Division staff officer give the order to blow the bridge, Bolger decided on his own that the order was wrong and immediately called Shanley by radio.

Because of Shanley's vehement protest, the order was suspended, then later cancelled. By that margin—a second lieutenant's willingness to dispute higher authority—the bridge was saved and was ultimately used to get the 90th Infantry Division and other Corps troops across the Merderet barrier.

Even so, Shanley was taking a shot in the dark. He was still without knowledge of the general situation and had made no contact with higher headquarters. In these circumstances, it might be a fair question whether his firmness about keeping the bridge open came of a self-generated optimism or more correctly from a reluctance to see destroyed the only link between himself and the one American party from which he had heard.

The considerations were, in fact, joined. At this time, though he did not know it, his was the only American force being employed tactically to the west of the Merderet. Elsewhere, except for a few isolated and immobilized groups which were simply awaiting rescue, the American forces had failed and the enemy was in solid possession of the countryside. By instinctively camping on the objective, he was in fact fighting the Corps' battle, but it was a close question whether, in the circumstances, he could hold out long enough to do the Corps any good.

That night, the regimental commander came to Chef du Pont and talked to Shanley. Lindquist agreed with everything he had done and told him to continue to defend on Hill 30. It was easy to say but hard to do. The force was short of ammunition and food, and almost wholly without medical supply. Casualties were mounting. The top of Hill 30 was getting a heavy dousing of mortar fire from an attack which the enemy was pressing against the northern side of the perimeter. Groups of skirmishers were closing in along the hedgerows and harassing the outpost line.

The situation called for a quick toss of a lifeline from the east.

to be continued

# The GI Bill and the Regular

THE DOOR TO GI BILL BENEFITS, GENERALLY, IS through the separation center. There's no neon sign above the Veterans Administration reading "No Regulars Allowed," but there might as well be. The Bill was designed for "veterans" not "careerists" and to benefit by it a regular marine must, in most cases, become a civilian within the next nine years.

But, as in most legislation, there are loopholes through which regulars can crawl with perfect legality. Perhaps the easiest is to marry a former servicewoman and use her privileges—the loan provisions for instance.

Another loophole, a perfectly legal one according to an administrative decision of the VA Solicitor's office, occurs in those cases where there was a definite break or separation in a marine's war service. Technically speaking, if the separation occurred under conditions

**Career men who have had a definite break in service and those who were eligible for discharge or inactive duty at the time they accepted regular service can qualify for Government benefits.**

other than dishonorable or if the officer or enlisted marine "was eligible for discharge under prevailing criteria (regulations)" at the time of transferring to the regulars or accepting a commission, eligibility is established.

For instance, if a marine was discharged to accept a commission at a time when he was eligible for complete separation from the service had he so requested, then he is eligible for GI benefits for his period of war service as an enlisted man.

Also eligible, and this applies to many present day marines, is any officer or enlisted man who could have requested inactive duty status or a discharge on points ("eligible for discharge under prevailing criteria") but who chose to transfer into the Regular Corps.

Even though there may have never been an actual break in service, there must be some document to establish at least a technical break. Once demonstrated, the regular can take his free flying lessons, night school, or arrange for a loan with VA help. So the picture is not all black. But if a marine doesn't qualify under the above exceptions, it's like holding a fat check without being able to get it endorsed. The endorsement in this case is the discharge, be it technical or real.

**By Maj William P. McCahill**

The rights and privileges—which we will call entitlements—of the GI Bill were established in the "Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944," as amended. The benefits, in most instances, expire on 25 July 1956 unless Congress extends this deadline. If a regular served at any time between the control dates of 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1946 he will be eligible for plenty of civilian assistance, whether he goes out "on thirty" in 1950, finishes up a cruise begun on V-J Day, or establishes his eligibility on a technicality.

Once a marine leaves the active ranks of the Corps, either through discharge, resignation, retirement, or request for inactive duty status, the Government considers him a "veteran."

A marine might consider the Bill similar to provisions of a will of a kindly but eccentric uncle, useable only if he renounces the Corps. Let's examine the Bill as it applies to present and future "veterans."

Whatever else it is, the GI Bill is a living thing. Subject to change through the will of the people, it has been amended 11 times since first passed on 22 June 1944 as Public Law 346 of the 78th Congress. Additional changes are certain, as in the case of any complex mechanism which requires time and experiment before reaching perfection. Today's GI Bill, as published by the authoritative *Army Times*, took up 11 pages and 33 columns of type 10 inches in height.

The Bill is divided into six parts, or "titles," which provide for:

(I) priorities to expand or implement standing programs for hospital or claims benefits,

(II) education,

(III) loans for purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business property,

(IV) employment,

(V) readjustment allowances for unemployed veterans.

(VI) general administrative and penal provisions of the Act.

Regulars will probably note from the above that their present service status covers any hospitalization or health problems, makes employment and readjustment allowances merely academic subjects for discussion, and frequently makes limited schooling possible. Hence, of the five operating titles of the GI Bill, the regular only comes a cropper when he wants to borrow money or embark on some intensive education at no cost to himself.

Yet in spite of the advantages offered, an *Army Times* survey last Fall indicated that only 55 per cent of the veterans were using or had used the Bill. It wrote:

"Among older GIs there is a general and bitter feeling that Uncle Sam has 'welshed' on his promised aid to veterans. Among the 55 per cent of all veterans who have used the GI Bill, the features most praised are the educational provisions, the features most maligned are the home loan provisions, the feature most used is the 52-20 unemployment pay section."

The survey showed that 66 per cent had used one type of aid, 30.8 per cent made use of two benefits, 2.8 per cent used three portions of available help and only 0.4 per cent received four benefits.

AMONG THE BENEFITS listed under Title I is a provision setting up a review board to examine the findings and decisions of medical survey, disposition, or retiring boards in the case of officers retired or released from

**Although the Bill was designed for veterans not careerists, the picture isn't all black. A regular may take advantage of the provisions for educational aids and loans for homes and farms if there has been a definite break in service**



**Over 6,359,000 veterans have already applied for some form of educational aid since the war's end.**

active duty without pay, as the result of a physical disability. Any interested marine must file his petition within 15 years from date of release.

It also provides for a board of review to examine requests for review of discharges of officers and men whose discharge bars them from GI Bill benefits. This does not apply to sentences of courts martial and the time limit for petition is also 15 years. Thus, if a Marine officer in a ill-advised moment should resign "for the good of the service and to escape general court martial" he still has a chance to have his case reviewed even after he leaves the Corps with a discharge under conditions other than honorable.

Also, servicemen may not be required to sign any statement concerning the "origin, incurrence or aggravation" of any disease or injury they may have and any such statement made in ignorance against the veteran's own interest in presenting any future claim for compensation or pension is "invalid."

Title I also makes it mandatory for a Marine officer or enlisted man, about to be discharged for disability, either to file a claim for pension, hospitalization, or compensation or to sign a statement that he has had his rights explained to him.

Under this title the marine "entitled to a prosthetic appliance (artificial limb) shall be furnished such fitting and training, including institutional training, in the use of such appliance as may be necessary."

The marine leaving the Corps can expect the best in medical treatment from the VA which had 3,630 full-time doctors employed on 1 August 1947 and was using 2,536 consultants and fee-basis doctors, many of them young Army and Navy combat medicos now back in civvies. The marine going out will have available 124 VA hospitals, some of a temporary nature, with 90 new hospitals due to be completed. Outpatient treatment and dental work for service connected cases is also available. During 1947 the VA examined 175,000 veterans every month and treated 154,000 as outpatients while 70,000 got dental exams and 45,000 were treated through a combination hometown care plan and VA dental service.

Probably the most valuable part of the GI Bill for the Regular who intends to leave the Corps prior to the expiration date of the various entitlements, 25 July 1956, is Title II dealing with education and training. It has had a stormy history and has been a center of controversy since its inception. Most of the debate has centered around the subsistence allowances of 90 dollars a month for veterans with dependents and 65 dollars for those without dependents who are pursuing higher education and the 200 dollars and 175 dollars ceilings for institutional on-farm and on-the-job training or apprenticeship or a combination of schooling and part time employment.

Last November, one out of every two of the 14,500,000 veterans of World War II had applied for some form of education or training under VA administered laws. However, this number had not actually undertaken training. Of the 6,359,000 applying under the GI Bill and 790,000 under Public Law 16, only 4,370,000 actually have entered into training. Of this total, some 355,000

**On the job training pays veterans the difference between wages paid an apprentice and the ceiling.**



disabled veterans elected to take the vocational rehabilitation provisions of Public Law 16.

Regulars, sitting on the sidelines of the debate over subsistence ceilings might ponder Gen Bradley's words before Congress: "I sincerely question whether we can justifiably condone the payment of such subsistence as a measure of support when we remember that the great majority of wage-earning veterans are participating in no way whatsoever in benefits of the job-training program."

According to the General, the ceilings were arrived at while considering the 100 dollar limitation for self-employment allowances, the 138 dollars paid monthly to totally disabled veterans and the average earnings of all workers, including farmers. "A moderate measure of support," he said, does not require that Congress is obliged for "the complete support of students."

Under Title II any marine on duty for 90 days or longer during the control dates (16 September 1940 and 25 July 1946) can study anywhere in the U. S. or territories or possessions and even in certain approved foreign institutions. A marine discharged for disability who served less than 90 days also is eligible for one year of schooling.

Regulars have four years after they leave the Corps in which they may make application for schooling, but all work must be completed by 24 July 1956, under present time limits.

The Government will pay the approved school selected as much as 500 dollars for an ordinary school year, or for a shorter but more extensive course (suppose you want to learn to fly). The Government pays the flat 90 or 65 dollars subsistence figure for veterans in school. For on-the-job training it pays the difference between wages paid an apprentice or trainee and the ceiling. In no case does the subsistence plus earnings exceed the journeyman's wage in the job for which the veteran may be training.

MAXIMUM ELIGIBILITY for school or OJT work is 48 months. Educational benefits eligibility can be figured at one year of schooling or training plus an additional month for every month served during the control period. A Marine NCO with 18 months' war service rates 2½ years' training. If he served through the entire control period he still gets no more than the maximum of 48 months' schooling.

If the discharged marine wants to pick up the broken ends of his high school education, special schools have been set up at various educational levels in many communities and the VA has announced a Veterans Testing Service whereby veterans can obtain diplomas from their former high schools merely by passing tests based on general information.

Marines getting out and wanting to learn a trade or



**Veterans have borrowed six billion dollars to build homes, buy farms, or to open their own businesses.**

wishing to take advantage of the OJT provisions must first find an employer willing to hire and train them in an approved course. One of the first jobs of Gen Erskine at RRA was to set up criteria and standards which were later used by Congress in telling the states what minimum qualifications were necessary for programs aimed to secure a veteran's future.

TITLE III hasn't worked out very well because the soaring cost of homes has priced many dwellings right off the veteran market. Some lenders have been requiring substantial sums of cash in down payment which is clearly against the intent of Congress which aimed to provide veterans with 100 per cent financing in the purchase or construction of homes.

The Government guarantees up to 50 per cent of the veteran's loan with a maximum of 2,000 dollars for business loans and 4,000 dollars on a home or farm loan. When you get around to using this provision, if you do, you'll get the first year's interest paid by the VA and you can't be charged higher than 4 per cent interest or 5.7 per cent simple interest for insured non-real estate loans.

Loans are available to:

(1) purchase, construct or improve a home;

(2) buy a farm, stock, feed and seed, farm machinery and other farm equipment and supplies;

(3) buy a business or otherwise enable a veteran to undertake a legitimate business venture;

(4) liquidate delinquent indebtedness, under certain conditions, incurred in connection with the above.

Marine veterans must pay off real estate loans in full within 25 years, business loans in 10 and farms in 40. Application must be made by July 25, 1957 (one year later than the deadline for educational benefits). By last October well over a million veterans had borrowed six billion dollars with VA help. Of these approved loans 971,500 were for homes, 36,700 for farms and 80,900 for business purposes.

Under Title IV operates the Veterans Employment Service which is in business to help the veteran get a job, promote interest among employers in hiring qualified veterans, and assist in the improvement of working conditions and advancement of veterans. The Veterans Reemployment Rights Division has the responsibility of seeing that a veteran gets his old job back or one equally as good for a period of one year if he wants it.

A marine getting out in the next few years and having trouble getting his old job back can contact any one of the 17 VRRD field offices for help.

An officer or enlisted man is assured of a breathing spell after discharge in the event he finds any difficulty in getting established in a job. Under Title V, veterans receive eight weeks of readjustment allowances for each of the first three months in uniform between the control dates and four extra weeks for each additional month served, up to a maximum of 52 weeks. In the case of self-employed veterans, the maximum time is 10-2/5 months.

This is better known as the 52-20 Club and veteran "members" having nine months or more of service may draw up to 20 dollars a week for 52 weeks if unemployed and if they fulfill certain provisions of the law. The veteran must be able to work, registered at a public employment office, and be available for suitable employment. Claims are filed weekly. All sums above three dollars earned in part time odd jobs must be subtracted from the twenty. Thus, if a veteran makes 10 dollars doing odd jobs while unemployed, he may only draw 13 dollars that week from the Government.

SELF-EMPLOYED VETERANS, including veteran farmers, who earn less than 100 dollars a month may make application for the difference between what they earn and 100 dollars. Claims are filed monthly.

A different time schedule prevails for this Title and allowances may only be claimed through 25 July 1949 or two years after discharge, whichever is later, with 24 July 1952 as the final deadline. During June 1947 an average of 713,000 veterans claimed 14,000,000 dollars unemployment allowances weekly. The 241,000 self-employment claims filed cost 24,000,000 dollars that month. Of these, 90 per cent were veterans engaged in farming.

In a statement prepared for the GAZETTE, Arthur Tryon, executive director of the Los Angeles Veteran Service Center, says: "I want to make a pitch in favor of the readjustment allowance section. Despite alleged abuses, I think that it has become a valuable measure of security for the veteran and has contributed greatly in assisting in the readjustment of the bulk of the veterans. My only regret is that personnel limitations and shortsighted policy have not allowed it to be used more effectively as a tool to sound vocational adjustments."

Marines who may someday avail themselves of the provisions of GI Bill might well consider the words of Mr Tryon who had worked with the Bill for the last several years. He says:

"I feel that the intent of the GI Bill was to assist servicemen in making up the three to five years which they lost and in enabling them to establish themselves at a level where they would have presumably been if the war had not intervened. I feel that for this reason the GI Bill cannot be considered a static instrument, but must be everchanging to carry out the original intent. However, I feel that over the past two years this has not been the case. The GI Bill has been outstripped by the economic and social changes which have taken place in the last two years."

The regular marine may consider the GI Bill as an insurance policy for possible future use, just as many brother officers and men of the "Citizen Marine Corps" have found it helpful since putting away the greens and khakis.

However, the GI Bill is not the only law which aims to assist veterans and their dependents. Most important single additional Act of Congress is Public Law 16, as amended, which provides vocational rehabilitation for disabled veterans with somewhat broader and more generous provisions than GI Bill.

ONE MAJOR SERVICE available to veterans and regulars alike not part of the GI Bill but a vital and sensible part of any thinking veteran's future welfare is the insurance program administered by the VA. Gen Omar N. Bradley, former VA Administrator, was frank to admit the many snarls and frustrations of the insurance program and the new Administrator, Carl Gray, has freely stated that insurance would be his number one problem.

Too many servicemen and veterans are still having bitter experiences with their insurance, but it is the best possible safeguard against future uncertainties and should be worth a temporary inconvenience.

Any marine wishing more specific answers than included in this article can inquire at a nearby VA office, at the Red Cross, from veterans organizations or at veterans information centers still in operation in many cities, thanks to the efforts of Marine MajGen Graves B. Erskine, former Administrator of the Retraining and Reemployment Administration.

US MC

# In Brief

A *new type* Marine Corps Reserve lapel button has been approved for issue to present members of the Marine Corps Reserve and to those persons who subsequently become members of the Reserve. Distribution of the new type button will be effected by activities of the Marine Corps Reserve and Division and District Recruiting Offices. These activities will receive an initial supply from the Depot of Supplies without requisition.

The Army Air Force's *largest helicopter*, the Kellett XR-10, is distinguished as the first twin-engined transport-type helicopter, and the first to be all metal. It has a top speed of over 100 miles per hour and can carry ten passengers in addition to the pilot and co-pilot. At a cruising speed of 90 miles per hour, the range is about 250 miles.

A self-propelled *floating berth* has been developed by BuDocks to bring big patrol seaplanes through choppy seas or high winds to a dock or mooring buoy. Capable of swinging in any direction, the new berth permits the planes to taxi into the wind on entering or leaving the slip. The berth operates like a floating drydock and can be used for emergency repairs of seaplanes where ramps are not available.

*Airborne tanks* mounting a 75mm gun with a muzzle velocity of from 3,800 to 4,000 feet per second have been developed by the Army to meet the trend of lighter, more mobile tanks with hole-punching ability. The new 25-ton tank and new cargo plane capable of carrying the tank make up the air-armor team.

*Inspection and evaluation* of atomic bomb damage to destroyer guns has been conducted at the U. S. Naval Gun Factory in Washington under the supervision of naval ordnance officers and engineers of the Bureau of Ordnance. The purpose was to determine which type guns were damaged, with the objective of redesigning them and improving the materials and techniques involved.

The Navy's *TG-190 jet engine*, normally developing 4850 pounds of thrust and capable of 5825 pounds of thrust with water injection, is the most powerful engine in the United States today. Despite weighing 40 pounds less than the TG-180, which powered the Douglas D-558 Skystreak on its world-breaking speed runs, the TG-190 develops 1000 pounds more thrust and has one more compression stage—12 stages in all.

The Air Forces has *completed firing tests* on P-84 Thunderjets and found them fully qualified for operational service. Seventy thousand rounds were fired from the six guns of one P-84 with more than 75 per cent of the rounds fired at plane speeds in excess of 600 mph. Firing time is about 50 per cent faster than aircraft guns used in World War II.

The Air Force plans to *triple its pilot training* program by increasing aviation cadet classes from 1000 a year to at least 3000 during 1948. To get the 3000 qualified men the USAF streamlined cadet procurement is eliminating costly psychomotor tests which had bottlenecked recruiting. No flying safety precautions will be done away with since the tests merely gauged the cadet's learning capacity.

The Navy and the Maritime Commission are *reconditioning for military use fifty tankers* from the Maritime Commission "laid-up" fleet. These ships will be Navy-owned but civilian manned and operated under contract with the Navy by several private steamship companies. The ships are officially designated USNT.

*Short-term aircraft preservation* will be accomplished in a shorter period of time with the Navy's development of a form-fitting zipper bag, coupled with drying agents. The new system cuts the time element from 120 man hours to 30 man hours and protects the entire plane instead of just critical components as did the old system of application of oil, grease, and preservative compounds.

# Swan Song for

# the Infantry

By LtCol R. C. Williams, USA

ON AUGUST 5TH, THE ARMY AIR FORCE DROPPED the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. This attack was repeated three days later with Nagasaki as the target. The Japanese quit soon after this second attack, attributing their defeat to the atomic bomb. We all have seen the photographs depicting the awful damage done to these two Japanese cities. We have read many accounts of the possibilities of the bomb. We have been told that the Japanese armies had not been decisively defeated in the field. Some people have said that the bomb has radically altered our economic, political, and military values.

Add to the atomic bomb some of the other modern weapons developed during this war. Look at the V-2 rockets with which the Germans bombarded London. The surrender of Germany brought to light the startling revelation that our enemies were in the process of developing a trans-Atlantic V-2 with which they intended to destroy New York city first and then other East Coast cities of the United States. Pilotless planes were in the mind of Gen Arnold when he declared that this may be the last war of the airplane pilot. Radar has also come to the fore, enabling navies to bombard each other on an inky black night. The new German submarine which could stay under water for weeks at a time is another of these modern developments. We have been told that these modern weapons prove that war has become basically a race between the enemy's factories and laboratories and those of our own country.

With all these terrible weapons coming to the front and potentially projected into the war of the future, we infantrymen naturally have some questions to which we must seek answers. First, has this war provided the "Swan Song" for the infantry? Second, what can we reasonably expect to see if we explore into the future? Let us try to draw upon our knowledge of history in or-

der to see what the development of new weapons has had on former wars, how they affected the military organizations, and how they affected the war which followed their development. After we have done this, we should be in a better position to logically determine the future of the infantry.

In the first place, we must assume that World War II hasn't been the last war to break forth on our universe. Some authorities say that war is a necessary evil. Others hold to the opinion that as long as two men remain on earth, one will want something the other one has and a

fight will be the ultimate result. Be that as it may, history has proven that every generation since Adam and Eve has seen a war. As much as we wish for peace, despite our belief that mankind should have realized by now the futility of war, still we would be foolish if we ignored the lesson provided by history and decided that there will be no future war. At least, we are playing safe if we prepare properly for one.

IN LOOKING BACK into history, we discover that, at first, battles consisted of literally hurling huge masses of men against other masses of men. The tools of war, the organization of armies, the strategy of war, and the tactics of battle were equally primitive. However, the same psychological factors, the same ambitions and aspirations, and the same economic and political considerations motivated wars in those days as do now. But, since brute force against brute force allowed much latitude for thought on the part of weaker nations, we find that ingenious contraptions were devised to offset superiority in brute force. Archimedes, for example, provided his countrymen with the super-catapult which held off the Roman onslaughts. In fact, from the day that David downed Goliath with a slingshot up to our own time when the plywood PT boats made many daring attacks upon Japanese destroyers and even cruisers, we find ingenuity making up for the lack of equality in force.

Huxley, in his essays, stated that "It is physical science that makes intelligence stronger than brute force."

The Roman Empire was built upon the first great disciplined armies of foot soldiers. But the Roman legions armed with sword, spear, and shield, gave way in the early Middle Ages to the age of knighthood. However, as in former days, the armor and lance of the knight was matched and we find that battles were knight versus knight, or the same old brute force against brute force. Crossbows were the artillery for distance shooting. Catapults were reserved for "the attack of a fortified position." It was the Swiss infantryman with his long pike and halberd who proved more than a match for the mounted knight and, with the use of gunpowder in combat, the days of the armed knight were over.

The introduction of gunpowder and firearms early in the 14th Century revolutionized military engineering, presented an entirely new set of problems for defense and logistics. Firearms dealt a mortal blow to feudalism, and the hitherto independent local rulers found themselves no longer behind impregnable castle walls. Artillery enabled the attacker to crush the stoutest of the medieval defenses.

It has been stated that the Golden Age of Arms began with Napoleon and ended with the termination of World War I. It was during this period that specialization in organization of armies, shock action, firepower, proper employment of reserves, speed and maneuver, time and space factors, began as military terms and ended as essential elements of things military.

THE MACHINE GUN made its appearance in World War I and, among other things, erased from the minds of every sensible person any illusion about the glories of war. This weapon frightened even the generals, who saw in its butchery a defensive weapon of such overwhelming strength that war was doomed as an effective means of accomplishing anything unless a new offensive weapon was developed to overcome it.

World War I, we find, began with overwhelming firepower and movement. The German armies rolled over Belgium and into France to a stalemate. Again, brute force was used against brute force and France lost 664,000 men in the 16 month period during which she attempted the brute force principal in attacking. The British tried the same method at Passchendale and in 4 months lost 400,000 men. So the land fighting was carried on by the infantry with the machine gun as the principal weapon. Artillery supported the foot soldier. The war proved that as soon as one side found a new technique for breaking through the enemy lines, the latter found a successful defense against it. The generals on both sides were convinced that neither a new weapon nor a new method could go unchallenged for long as it was proven that counter-effectives were soon discovered.

The tank was another secret weapon which was supposed to have won World War I for the Allied Forces. Gen Ludendorff himself has described 8 August, 1918, as "the black day of the German army in the history of the war," for on that day 465 tanks were thrown into an attack at Amiens, and according to the Germans, completely unnerved their men. Yet they did not win the war

for us. The tank was first used in World War I in 1916 and was a military failure, in the opinion of both the user and the enemy. In fact, when the Armistice was signed in 1918 only 50 German tanks were captured, a sure sign that they did not see in it a decisive secret weapon which could win the war. It is true that Hitler's generals remembered the "black day" of 8 August 1918 for tank production in Nazi Germany was second only to aircraft production.

But the tank was soon proven to have lost its reputation for invincibility. Antitank guns, mines, Molotov cocktails, the bazookas, all play thei part. In fact, one military analyst, in his writings, compared the position of the tank in Tunisia to the position in which horse cavalry of World War I found itself when the machine gun became the principal weapon.

RUSSIA, ITALY, AND GERMANY had developed new weapons, new methods, new ideas, and found in the Spanish Civil War an excellent opportunity to test these new things. Here was the laboratory and the guinea pigs and the costs for its use ridiculously low. The dive-bombing and tank attacks in Spain were the dress rehearsal for the blitzkrieg in Poland.

Harrison, in *Atoms in Action*, said "Science does not make war more terrible, it merely makes it seem more terrible, which is a very desirable result."

Secret weapons is a term which has been used constantly in this World War II through which we have just passed.

The passengers and crew of the *Simon Bolivar* used it. This Dutch merchant ship was making its way along the



east coast of England on 18 November 1939, when a tremendous explosion which seemed to come from beneath her hull, pushed her steel bottom upwards and caused her to sink. This sinking was followed by others, bringing the total of ships sunk in this fantastic fashion to 10 in three days. On the 21st of November, the Japanese liner, *Terukuni Maru*, and the British destroyer *Gypsy*, were blown up near the mouth of the Thames. These explosions had occurred in closely patrolled coastal water, where minesweeping and submarine detection facilities were considered adequate. No explanation, other than the term "German secret weapon" was offered.

But British lookouts had reported low flying German aircraft over the areas the evenings before the sinkings occurred. When fighters rose to challenge this night visitor, the latter always headed home. Then, two nights after the *Gypsy* was lost, lookouts saw a German plane flying low over the Thames and were sure it had dropped some "dark objects" into the water. These objects were attached to parachutes, they believed. The next morning, a diligent search was rewarded by the discovery of one of these dark objects on a sandbank on the shore.

The results of this discovery are now known to the world. The German magnetic mine was found, studied, and a means to combat it by using the very principle of physics that activated it, was devised, the "degaussing girdle." Here, then, is just one more example of how temporary a "revolutionary secret weapon" is in this world of ours.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN also provides a lesson worth remembering. Here was 12 weeks of almost continual warfare which aimed at the destruction of a nation. The first phase of this Battle was a ten day attack against ports and shipping, during which the Germans sank five ships, damaged five others, strafed several channel ports, and lost 695 aircraft. The second phase was aimed at the airfields. Again, in 12 days damage was inflicted upon the targets, some serious destruction of airfield facilities was accomplished, but the cost was 610 German planes. The third phase had as its objective the destruction of industrial centers, especially London. Again, as before, the Germans did damage. Their incendiaries started fires and destroyed docks. Thousands of buildings were demolished. Even Buckingham Palace was hit. Every day the Germans increased the strength of their attacking echelons and each day lost more aircraft and pilots. The 15th of September has been called "the great day" for on that day Goering sent 500 planes over to London and lost 185 of them and 516 of his top pilots. On October 5th, Goering quit. He had lost 2,375 planes and his Luftwaffe had shot down 600 British fighters. In his 87 day battle, he had caused considerable destruction in London and other cities. His airmen had killed 14,281 persons and had wounded 20,325 civilians. But his Luftwaffe had not broken British resistance, British shipping was not wiped out, and the British war production was not seriously hampered. He had failed in his attempt to bring Britain to her knees by the overwhelming use of airpower. Why?

It is known that skill and courage alone do not win wars. Equipment is necessary. The British, realizing the strides made by Goering in the matter of aircraft production, laid plans for planes that would outclass the Geramn craft. The result was the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Then, too, realizing that the Luftwaffe would attack, a search was conducted for suitable warning devices to provide sufficient time for the British fighters to gain alti-

tude. This result was radar.

The lesson to be learned from the Battle of Britain, I believe, is that, although an army may have a preponderance of new weapons, and in this instance the Germans had the latest in aircraft, it cannot of itself bring a first class nation to its knees. Its advantage is temporary, and "Spitfires, Hurricanes, and Radars" will always be developed to counterattack that advantage in short order. But, you might say that the strength of Goering's air armada was trifling compared to the U.S. Air Force fleets that flew over Germany several years later. True, but when the Luftwaffe came over England they had a decided advantage. When our Forts went over Germany they were met by very accurate flak, fighters, radar plots, smoke screens, and jet fighters. Then, too, our aircraft would go over Cologne, "raze it to the ground," according to newspaper accounts, and then the next night repeat the performance. Surely cities cannot be built overnight.

WHEN HITLER'S LEGIONS swept across Poland, the Low Countries, and France, many so-called military analysts declared that the days of the infantry as the Queen of Battles were numbered. All these analysts could see was the fact German "armored spearheads knifed their way at breakneck speed, crushing all resistance as if it were made of eggshell." Their thoughts were in terms of mechanization, motorization, Mark VI tanks, Stuka dive bombers, paratroopers, secret weapons. But these brain trusters couldn't see behind the trees of 25 armored divisions and 10 motorized divisions and thus were unable to appreciate the German forest of 265 infantry divisions.

It is true that the Germans replaced the antiquated weapons of the last war with new modern equipment. It is also true that they developed an infantry-artillery-tank-airplane team. But their teamwork and modern weapons were stopped at Stalingrad by Russian infantry. Their most successful general, Rommel, might have been stopped at the Quattara Depression by lack of supplies if we are to listen to the German Sartorius, but it was Montgomery's infantry who twined and broke the German battle line at Quattara and again at Mareth. It was the infantry who brought the flower of the German Army, the Afrika Korps, to its knees in Tunisia. Infantrymen plodded through the mountains of Sicily; infantrymen landed behind the Germans several times in that campaign to cut them off; infantrymen drove the shattered German remnants across the straits of Messina. Infantry held at Salerno and again at Anzio. Infantry broke the Boche line at St Lo, the Siegfried Line, the Rhine. The most ardent infantryman won't insist that the infantryman won the war alone. Anyone who has been there will attest to the effectiveness of the artillery in these decisive attacks—in the Quattara breakthrough, for example. The thinking soldier will be the first to compliment the Air Corps on their fine work—in the decisive battle in Tunisia, for example. Yes, the tanks, heavy guns, the planes, they all helped and did a fine job, but it was the infantry who went up and took the ground, who killed or captured the enemy, who defeated his field armies and caused him to "throw in the sponge."

THE TORPEDO has always been a secret weapon inasmuch as it has constantly been improved. During World War I, when the Germans sincerely believed that the torpedo would prove our undoing if we attempted to send men and supplies across the Atlantic, it was responsible for over 2000 ship sinkings totalling some 6 million tons. In World War II, it has been responsible for the sinking of such mighty battleships as the *Prince of Wales*, the *Repulse*, and the *Bismark*. It has destroyed such carriers as the *Ark Royal*, the *Lexington*, and others. It has sunk many transports, oilers, and lesser combatant ships. Yet the submarine chasers, the "fighter-killer" groups, the depth charge, and the increased speed of ships defeated it as a decisive secret weapon. Despite its improvements in speed, wake reduction, and control, it still had to be launched and the submarine heard its own Swan Song in those terse words "Saw sub; sank same."

Recoil has bothered military men from the beginning. In the siege of Port Arthur in 1905, the Russians found it a terrific problem. They had installed a battery of wheeled guns on a hillside, but found that when they fired a piece, the gunners had to race down the hill after a runaway gun and haul it back to position. The French

perfected a secret device called a "recuperator" which cut down recoil and gave fame to their 75s. The high velocity of antitank weapons increased the problem of recoil. What was done in this war to solve the problem? Well, the rocket was developed for use on land, on ships, and on planes. The infantry received weapons which were revolutionary in that they were recoilless.

Warfare may have become more mechanized with each passing year, but the actual percentage of deaths caused by the introduction of new weapons into combat does not show an increase in the number of the enemy killed. Col Sears, USA, has stated that: "At Cannae in 216 BC, 60 per cent of the Roman Army were killed by Hannibal's Carthaginians in one day of fighting with swords and

spears. In Waterloo in 1815, after muzzle-loading firearms and black powder had come into existence, the English lost 22 per cent of their army, killed on the battlefield in one day. At Gettysburg in 1863, when breech-loading rifles began to make their appearance, 8½ per cent of the Union Army were killed in three days fighting, or less than 3 per cent per day. At the Meuse-Argonne in the World War (1918), after the development of smokeless powder, magazine rifles, and automatic weapons, the American Army lost 2½ per cent in battle casualties in 47 days, or .05 per cent a day." The military man must remember that medicine, with its improved methods of evacuation and treatment, its plasma, penicillin, and newer drugs is keeping pace with the improved weapons of war.

Although poison gas has been often called the "weapon of terror" it was not born during World War I. History tells us that the Spartans soaked wood with pitch and sulphur and heaved these burning sticks over the walls of Greek cities. Sulphur dioxide was released and the Greek garrisons gassed. This occurred in the 5th Century B.C. At Plataea, the Spartans used another variation of poison gas which included arsenic. The Christians in Belgrade used poison gas fumes against the Turks in the 15th Century. It is interesting also to note that poison gas was first used by the French in August 1914 in the form of bromine tear gas rifle grenades, nearly a year before the Germans put it to the test at Ypres. The improvements of the "strange yellow fog" at Ypres on 22 April, 1915 never overcame the constant improvements made on the gas mask. Phosgene replaced the yellow cloud to fool the enemy, but the British had provided their men with masks containing sodium phenolate. Mustard was next to appear, then sternite, adamsite, and lewisite. But countermeasures kept pace with these newer gases. So, the "weapon of terror," discovered and employed in Europe before gunpowder, was relegated to the shelf of outlawed weapons.

OPERATING WEAPONS and instruments of war by remote control is not new. In 1931, for example, the U.S. Navy sent the destroyer *Stoddert* out to sea without a human being aboard, and controlled the course of the ship by radio. The firing of guns was successfully controlled by mechanical robots in 1929 by our Army Ordnance Department.

Those who believe in a secret weapon which in itself will win a war must also take into consideration human psychological reactions. Great Britain had few men and fewer weapons to confront the victorious German forces in June 1940, but her determination was quite clearly stated by Churchill when he said "We shall defend our island whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on beaches, landing grounds, in fields, in streets, on the hills; we shall never surrender; and even if, which I do not for the moment believe, this island or a part of it were subjugated and starving, then our empire beyond the sea, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, will carry on the struggle until in God's good time the New World, with all its power and might, sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the Old." That psychology is all important was realized perfectly by none other than the old master of them all, propaganda minister Goebbels, who said to Goering "You wouldn't have to fight at all if I had my way." The gnome of Hitler could see that air

armadas are nothing when compared to properly applied propaganda.

Warfare is inseparably joined with progress—the progress of mankind. Scientists make gyroscopes and we find gyroscopes in torpedoes. Scientists develop aerodynamic ideas which we find are embedded in B-29s. Doctors discover a drug that will prevent a disease and we see a general who bends every effort to seize the source of supply of that drug in order to be able to defeat a malaria ridden enemy in that area.

History has shown how the machine gun was replaced as "the weapon" by the tank, how the tank itself met its Waterloo by the antitank gun, the Molotov cocktail, the mine and the Dragon's Teeth, and the plane. The war which is now history proved how the bomber has to keep away from the fighter and how both had to avoid the antiaircraft gun. AA guns must avoid bombs. The submarine can sink the battleship with a torpedo, but it must avoid destroyers, mines, and depth bombs. Mines can be swept by minesweepers, torpedoes stopped by nets, battleships sunk by planes, and so on in an endless circle.

THIS WAR through which we have just passed has not sounded the Swan Song for the infantryman anymore than have wars of the past. History has shown that after every war the principal idea in everyone's mind was that the next one would be a colossal staggering terrible conflict, too hideous and destructive to contemplate. Every war has its weapons and equipment which would prove disastrous to the enemy in the next conflict. But the fact has remained that, although their weapons and equipment will change with the progress of science and industry, the infantrymen will remain as the basic element of the armies of the future. US MC

# The Company Property Book

By 1stLt William E. Shea

IN THE MARINE CORPS TODAY THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 rifle company commanders. This leaves 5,950 Marine Corps officers whose every professional act and effort is channeled in the form of assistance to complement the work of the rifle company commanders, who are, *in one sense*, the key officers in the entire Marine Corps.

The responsibility vested in the command of a rifle company is in no wise a proper reflection of the importance of such a command to the Marine Corps. At the present time, an officer is given command of a rifle company, or comparative unit, about one third of the way along in his career. Arbitrarily, it might be stated that his average age is 30 years, his rank, that of captain. It is not presumed here to belittle the rank, age, or experience of the company commander; rather, to present the far reaching responsibility vested in him and to consider one important phase of his job.

The dollar value and functional value of the property used by a rifle company is negligible in the light of total global war. But, in a peacetime military establishment it represents a respectable portion of the taxpayers' contribution to the armed forces. The depth of the company commander's appreciation for the government property in use by his company will, in the final analysis, be reflected in the overall efficiency of the Marine Corps as a whole.

Today, there exists within company echelon a system for the accounting of government property that has developed over a period of years through tradition and usage. The basis of this system is the "property account" maintained by the unit supply NCO on form N.M.C. 748-QM, (Now obsolete for Supply Department purposes) and the consolidated memorandum receipt which every company commander signs and acknowledges his personal responsibility for the company property.

The advantages and disadvantages of the present system are so well known to all officers who are or have been company commanders that a detailed description can be eliminated here.

Without subtracting one procedure or function from the present system, the use of a *company property book*, a service record book for each company and comparable unit, can be of valuable assistance to the company commander in his property accounting. This book would consist of a permanent binder and blank insert pages as illustrated.

At the outset, three questions are immediately posed: 1. *How does this system differ, in operation, from the present system?*

Today, the present system reaches its peak of efficiency immediately after each of the periodic inventories conducted by the commanding officer and his supply NCO. From the position of the company commander, the time lag between inventories causes the inventory sheets to become invalidated; the supply NCO continues to maintain his controls in the form of the property account *which is not always readily accessible to the company commander.* Since there is no known method of replacing the inventory, we can increase the efficiency of the existing accounting procedures by bridging the time lag with the addition of the *company property book.*

The initial effort calls for the transcription of all Class II property and such other property as is authorized a rifle company, or comparable unit, to the company property book. Whether or not serialized items such as rifles, mortars, etc., would be consolidated on one page or excluded from the system would be left to local decision. When all property had been transcribed to the company property book, one item per page, the system would work as follows.

Daily, the unit supply NCO would note the changes affecting the company property in the company property book at a time determined locally. If the information is transcribed at the beginning of or prior to organizational office hours, the company commander would have the information at the beginning of each working day. When he sat down to review the morning report, change sheet, and other matters relative to the personnel administration of his command, he would in turn come to the administrative changes in his unit's property. The commanding officer would turn to the marked pages, and *initial the current information* on the items of property that had undergone a change in the last 24 hours. At this point, the company property book appears to be just so much additional red tape. In the normal routine, this function would require less time than a review of the morning report. Few company commanders would permit the day to start without reviewing the *disposition of the personnel* of the command as evidenced by the morning report and the change sheet. Cannot we

**The value of company property in a peacetime military establishment is trivial when compared to the cost of a global war, yet it represents a large contribution by the taxpayers. The overall efficiency of the Marine Corps is reflected in its care**

apply this same logic to the company property?

2. *What effect does this system have on present procedures?*

THE USE OF a company property book in no way supersedes the instruments now in effect for the accounting of company or detachment property. The consolidated memorandum receipt from the accountable officer requiring the signature of the commanding officer would not be affected. The property accounting systems established by the supply NCO or local SOP would not be affected. The company property book would act as an adjunct to the already established procedures in presenting to the company commander a clear, concise, and accurate picture of his property that is always at hand.

3. *What beneficial results can be expected through the use of the company property book?*

The benefit is seen principally from the position of the company commander. At present, the information, which could be consolidated in the company property book, is to be found in three places:

a. The consolidated memorandum receipt that he signed, in some instances as far back as six months ago.

b. Tables of Equipment and Tables of Basic Allowances that tell him how much property he is authorized.

c. The property account of the company that is maintained by the supply NCO and normally found in the property storeroom.

The use of the company property book places all of this detailed information in one, easily seen picture. The daily initialing of the current information in regard to the company property eliminates the possibility of the company commander being *without the up-to-the-minute facts.*

No attempts is made here to detract from the professional ability, integrity, or prestige of the supply NCO; and no attempt is contemplated to place the company commander in the shoes of the supply NCO. In the company, one person alone is responsible to the organizational accountable officer for the property in use, and that is the commander. Through the use of the company property book he has complete and accurate information on his desk in a consolidated form, on a 24 hour basis rather than a weekly or semi-monthly review of the property account maintained by the supply sergeant.

Like all other controls of this nature, the company property book will benefit the using organization in direct proportion to the maintenance that it receives.

US MC

## COMPANY PROPERTY BOOK

| Date 1948 | Vou No | Gains | Losses | On Hand | On Req | Remarks | CO's Initials |
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**Article (Correct nomenclature)**
**Stock No: 000-00-000**
**Class of Property**
**Authorized by T/BA (T/E)**
**Amount Auth 00-**

# Japan's Secret War Within

**By Bertram Vogel**

IF YOU WERE TO ASK THE AVERAGE PERSON WHAT was responsible for Japan's decision to surrender prior to an American invasion of the Japanese homeland, he would probably reply that it was the atomic bomb. The Russians, who have a remarkable knack for distorting history, maintain that it was their entry into the war which forced Japan out. And we in the Navy and in the Marine Corps, of course, know bloody well who really won the Pacific War.

But the true facts behind Japan's decision to surrender are somewhat different. For the actual truth of the matter is that, under any circumstances, Japan would have surrendered before the end of 1945—probably by the middle of October.

Although the Japanese government made a desperate effort during the last year of the war to arouse its people from their lethargy, and although it boasted incessantly of its determination to fight to the finish, the peculiar fact is that the morale of Japan's leaders was shattered long before that of the general population. It has, for example, been frequently overlooked that at no time did the Japanese people, well regimented and thoroughly trained to obey their oligarchic rulers, exert serious pressure for surrender. There was, of course, a die-hard clique within the military who would have scrapped Japan's future for their own pride and who would have fought to the last bit of rubble in Honshu, but the majority of Japanese officials had already seen—and understood—the nature of American military strength. They were convinced that resistance was futile.

An analysis of the record makes patent the fact that Japan's determination to surrender was serious even as early as the spring of 1944. The actual decision to surrender was delayed only by a government system sensitive to conflicting pressures which included the Lord Privy Seal, the Emperor's personal adviser and the trustee of his political authority; the *Jushin*, or elder statesmen, who had no active authority but considerable influence in all quarters; and the Army and Navy, which appointed their own cabinet ministers, which distrusted each other, and which were actually in fear of their own fanatics until the bitter end. A fourth and equally critical factor was that of national "face," a domestic as well as an international stumbling block.

The first significant manifestation of political trouble in the Japanese homeland came shortly after the fall of Saipan, when Tojo, whose authority had been almost absolute and whose cabinet had been in office for approximately three years, resigned. Since Tojo had long been the chief symbol of a military fanaticism which had relentlessly gripped Japan since the Manchurian conquest, the importance of his fall from grace can hardly be underestimated. Many of Japan's statesmen, ex-Ambassador Adm Nomura among them, had apparently been convinced from the outset that Japan could not wage war successfully against the United States for more than a year or two, and it was their conviction that Tojo and his clique had led Japan into a war without any consideration of how Japan could survive beyond that period.

As long as things went well for Japan, of course, they could neither displace Tojo nor openly oppose him. But when the American offensive really got under way in the Marshalls and Gilberts, the oppositionists made a series of careful moves. Thus, for example, Adm Sokichi Takagi, who at various times was attached to Naval General Headquarters and who at that time was Chief of the Navy Ministry's Bureau of Education, began jockeying in March, 1944, for the removal of Tojo.

ADMIRAL TAKAGI, who had undertaken a special study of the war, had already concluded that Japan could not possibly win, and he now gave his reasons to Adm Yonai in no uncertain terms. Indeed, Takagi's report was so forthright and so blunt that it suggested that Japan seek a compromise peace immediately. Still more remarkable

was the fact that Takagi recommended that Japan withdraw from China and yield Formosa and Korea in order to effect such a peace. Since Japan's chief naval leaders had secretly doubted Japan's chances for victory, they were in essential agreement with Takagi's findings. But, after all, this was the spring of 1944, and they were hardly prepared for Takagi's drastic recommendations, which apparently frightened them right out of their breeches. In any event, however, the information was passed along to Marquis Kido, the Lord Privy Seal. The fall of Saipan, then, constituted the final straw against Tojo. His resignation, which was virtually forced, marked the beginning of the end for the military fanatics—and the real beginning of Japan's quest for peace.

Marquis Kido, however, was an old hand at political manipulation and his legs could carry him back and forth over the fence with astounding agility. If it was too late to undo the treachery at Pearl Harbor, it was also too early to call off the war, and the Marquis chose to ride along with a new man, Koiso.

KOISO, WHO WAS instructed by the Emperor to reconsider Japan's course, stated that he would prosecute the war with increased vigor. As a practical administration the Koiso Cabinet was not particularly effective, but it did accomplish two things: it reduced the importance of the Tojo clique, and it provided, in August, 1944, for the establishment of a Supreme War Direction Council.

According to information provided after the war by Adm Yonai, the Supreme War Direction Council consisted of six regular members—the Premier, the Army and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Foreign Minister—and its major function was to consider non-operational aspects of the war. For the most part, it was an effective liaison between the military and the government, but since it did participate in meetings with the Emperor, its opinions were highly significant. In spite of the fact that it had no knowledge of operational matters, it ultimately became something of a top war cabinet, and there is no doubt that it served as a direct repudiation of the original military clique. Its very existence was a rebuff to high-handed Tojo supporters within the Army.

Adm Yonai, who was then Vice-Premier and Minister of the Navy under Koiso, was not satisfied with Japan's compromise status, however, and in September, 1944, he ordered Adm Takagi to undertake a secret study of the means whereby Japan could get out of the war. Marquis Kido, Prince Konoye, Marquis Matsudaira, and Adm Oikawa, the naval chief of staff, all were in on the conferences, but the chief problem, of course, was that of selling the idea to certain key Army officers. Adm Takagi himself was willing even to foment a rebellion within the Army in order to achieve his purpose of getting Japan out of the war.



**Gen Hideki Tojo's long reign as War Minister came to an end as Allied offensives gained momentum.**

SINCE JAPAN had done some good horse trading in 1935, a number of its senior statesmen were naively confident that it could effect another *coup*, and in March, 1945, Prince Higashikuni, an ineffectual figurehead, advocated use of China as a mediator. What Prince Higashikuni had in mind is not precisely clear, but presumably Japan was to withdraw from China and Manchuria.

In February, 1945, the Emperor, who was now eager

**Japanese officials saw and understood American military might and realized that the war was lost as early as Spring 1944. Baron Suzuki sought a way to end the conflict and still save national face. Die-hards delayed the peace bid**

**Gen Kuniaki Koiso's Supreme War Direction Council fell seven days after the Allies invaded Okinawa.**

to obtain the best possible advice concerning the war and Japan's position, called various members of the *Jushin* into private conference. Prince Konoye, an ex-Premier and political riddle who was among those summoned, presented a memorandum to the Emperor orally. Part of the memorandum follows:

> I think that there is no longer any doubt about our defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain on our history, but we can accept it, so long as we can maintain our Tenno system. Public opinion in America and Britain on the whole is not yet, at least, so bad as to demand a fundamental change in that system. What we have to fear, therefore, is not so much a defeat as a Communist revolution which might take place in the event of defeat.
>
> Conditions, internal as well as external, point to the danger of such revolution. In the first place, there has been a notable ascendancy of Soviet Russia in world politics. In the light of her recent activities in Europe, we must judge that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshevising the whole world. She is prosecuting such a policy vis a vis the Far East, and I fear interference in our domestic affairs.
>
> In the last few months, the slogan "Hundred Million Die Together" has become increasingly louder, seemingly among the right-wing people, but has its real basis in the activities of the Communists.
>
> Under such circumstances, the longer we continue the war, the greater will be the danger of revolution.
>
> The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the existence of the military group which has been "propelling" the country into the present state ever since the Manchurian Incident—the group which, having already lost all hope of successfully concluding the war, nevertheless insists on its continuation in order to save face. If we try to stop the war abruptly, these military extremists together with both the right and left wing, might attempt anything—even a bloody internal revolt, and thereby nullify our efforts. The prerequisite to the conclusion of the war, therefore, is to wipe out the influence of these dangerous people and reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your Majesty to make a serious decision to that end.[1]

Seven days after the invasion of Okinawa the Koiso Cabinet fell, and Adm Baron Suzuki took over. The change was like that from day to night. Where Koiso, "the Tiger of Korea," was gruff and impatient, Suzuki was quite and amiable. An old-timer who had commanded a destroyer flotilla in the Russo-Japanese War, he had secured ratification of the London Naval Treaty against tremendous odds, had been badly wounded by three shots from the pistol of a military fanatic assigned to kill him in 1936, and could speak excellent English. He made his stand clear almost immediately. Indeed, practically his first official act was to sympathize with the United States over the loss of President Roosevelt: "I must admit that Roosevelt's leadership has been very effective, and has been responsible for the Americans' advantageous position today. For that reason I can easily understand the great loss his passing means to the American people, and my profound sympathy goes to them." The new Premier was making his first psychological bid for favorable American public opinion.

But since by this time Japan's problem was not to decide to get out of the war but to find a face-saving means of getting out, it had to reckon with two particularly taxing questions. One, what terms could it obtain? And two, what could it tell its people? To Suzuki, Yonai, and the others those were all-important considerations.

To facilitate matters, Suzuki ordered Hisatsune Sakomizu, the young son-in-law of former Premier Okada, one of the Emperor's most trusted advisers, to make a study of Japan's military potential. Sakomizu, who lets no grass grow under his feet, was back in a month with a conclusive report that Japan could not continue the war. Since this was what Suzuki expected—and wanted—he presented the facts to the Emperor at once. Furthermore,

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[1]From Appendix A-5 of the excellent USSBS report, "Japan's Struggle to End the War." I am indebted to this report for a number of facts in my present article.

he asked another ex-Premier, Hirota, to find out what he could from the Russian ambassador in Tokyo about Russia's willingness to mediate for Japan.

THAT THE JAPANESE were now sweating it out was made obvious in a post-war interrogation of Adm Toyoda, who in May, 1945, became Chief of the Naval General Staff, a position which automatically made him a member of the Supreme War Direction Council. According to Adm Toyoda, at a meeting of the Council on June 6 it was concluded that "unless some radical measure could be adopted to arouse the people, the nation's war power was bound to decline very rapidly. That is not to say that anyone there expressed the opinion that we should ask for peace; for when a large number of people are present like that, it is difficult for any one member to say that we should so entraeat. So the decision was that something must be done to continue this war."[2]

Two days later, however, the same members were back again—this time before the Emperor—and were now going all-out to obtain the assistance of Russia for purposes of mediation. It is a peculiar and vivid example of the Japanese mind at work.

On June 26 the Emperor once again summoned the Council. This time he stated that although it was necessary to continue prosecution of the war, it was also necessary to consider the possibility of terminating the war. It was a peculiarly Japanese way of putting a delicate matter delicately—with the paradox the ultimate form of logic. At any rate, reported Adm Toyoda, in reply to the Emperor "the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister stated that they concurred fully with the Imperial view and that such steps were now being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the Ministers expected to be able to send a special Ambassador to Moscow. The reply given was that the date was not certain but hoped that he would be sent before the Potsdam Conference should be held."

On July 10 the Emperor called the Foreign Minister and suggested that a special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow without delay. According to Adm Toyoda, the situation "was that the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo was reported ill and the Foreign Office was having difficulty in maintaining contact with the Russian embassy here, so it was decided to send instructions to our Ambassador in Moscow to propose to submit to the Russian Government our proposal to send a special ambassador there. Our Ambassador Sato in Moscow approached the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs with this proposal. . . . That was about the 13th of July that this conversation took place in Moscow, and the answer given was that since Stalin and Molotov were both about to depart for Potsdam, they promised to give an answer upon their return to Moscow."

**Adm Kantaro Suzuki sought face-saving method of getting out of war and preserving Japanese honor.**

The actual Russian answer was finally forthcoming on August 8. It consisted of notification that Russia was severing all diplomatic relations with Japan. On the following day Russia declared war.

Japan's final actions have been described by Adm Toyoda:

> Continuing with the story of the meetings of the Supreme War Guidance Council, there was no member of that Council who had any fundamental objection to terminating the war, but there was some question raised as to whether or not all the terms of the Potsdam Declaration would be acceptable to Japan. The points upon which considerable discussion took place were three: (1) the question of the Emperor's future position; (2) the question of disposition of war criminals; and (3) the question of Japan's future form of organization.
>
> On the first point, namely, the question of the Emperor's position, all the members were united in their view that it should be maintained. On the question of war criminals, the desire was expressed by some of the members that the Japanese Government should be

[2]Adm Toyoda's quotations in this article have been selected from Interrogation Nav No. 75, *Interrogations of Japanese Officials*, Vol. II.

permitted to ferret out and try the war criminals; and as regards Japan's "future form of National Organization," the desire was expressed that since the present organization of the country was one based upon the deep convictions of the people we should be permitted to maintain the present form. In other words, determination of the form that it should have in the future should be left to the Japanese people and not, for instance, to a plebiscite organized by Allied authorities.

These discussions took place on 9 August and as there was no agreement, a meeting was called in the presence of the Emperor on the 10th at about 0230 in the morning; and the decision was reached there that, subject to the condition that the Emperor's position should in no way be affected, the term of the Potsdam Declaration would be accepted.

After the meeting held in the morning of the 10th, our readiness to accept the Potsdam Declaration was transmitted to the United States Government through the neutral Governments of Switzerland and Sweden. The official reply of the United States Government was received on the 13th, but we learned the purport of that reply from a San Francisco broadcast on the 12th. The Supreme War Guidance Council reconvened on the 13th and continued the meeting until late at night, discussing the American reply.

On the question of the Emperor's position, the American reply made no direct statement but did state that the powers of the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The main point of discussion at that meeting had to do with the Emperor's position, since it was the conviction of the Japanese people that the Emperor was a living god above whom there could be no earthly being. It was feared that the Japanese people would not readily accept the wording of the reply which placed the Emperor in a position subordinate to that of the Supreme Commander of the Occupation Forces. In practice, of course, it was readily understandable that such would have to be the situation because, being the defeated power, it was understandable that our head should have to be placed in a position subordinate to that of the representative of the victorious powers; but the language as it was worded, it was felt, would be found difficult to accept. So to overcome that difficulty, the suggestion was made that, would it not be possible to have the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Occupation Forces go directly to the Japanese Government and that those orders would be passed on by the cabinet to the Emperor, who, in pursuance of his constitutional right, would carry out the work connected with the termination of the war. However, no conclusion was reached after those discussions and the fear was expressed that, in view of the international relation obtained at that time, the Allied Powers would not accept such a set-up. Therefore, another meeting was held on the 14th in the presence of the Emperor which led to the decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration in its full form.

The Imperial decision to bring the war to a close was made by the Emperor himself without suggestions from any other quarters. The words that he used on that occasion might be summed up somewhat as follows:

> 'Continuation of the war does not promise successful conclusion no matter from what angle the situation is considered. Therefore I have decided, without suggestions from anyone, to order the conclusion of the war, as I cannot endure the thought of having to kill tens, even hundreds of thousands of my subjects, and moreover to have to be called the disturber of world peace. Moreover, it is extremely difficult for me to have to turn over to the Allied authorities officers and men upon whom I have depended all this time as though they were part of my own body. But I have decided to endure what is unendurable and to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.'

He closed his statement by saying that if necessary he would go to the radio and broadcast to the people in addition to issuing the Imperial Rescript and he asked for the continued assistance of the members of the council. It was a very moving scene.

IN VIEW OF THE FACTS, of course, certain conclusions are obvious. There is no doubt that the majority of Japan's statesmen and naval leaders were determined, from the very moment that the tide of war turned against them, to effect a compromise peace. In typical Japanese fashion, however, they were extremely reluctant to broach a matter which would openly compromise them, and they were constantly deterred and handicapped both by fear of the Army and by the problem of "face." Ultimately, the decision to withdraw from the war was of far less significance or concern than the manner of withdrawing, which was further complicated by the justifiably shrewd United States policy of unconditional surrender.

Until the very end the Japanese sought to maintain the illusion of "choice"—not to deceive themselves, of course, but to give them some caste in the eyes of their people. From their point of view it was imperative that they appear publicly to have some degree of control over terms. The final ruse used was that of Japan's newly-found concern for the welfare of its people—a ruse made singularly effective by the sudden use of the atomic bomb. Had the atomic bomb not been used, the Japanese government would have found its concern for the public at the last moment prior to a scheduled American invasion. Again, because of their necessity for maintaining the illusion of choice, the Japanese dared not wait until an actual invasion took place, for such an event would have stripped them of the last shred of "face" and would have laid bare the harsh facts of reality. What Japan's leaders wanted to be able to tell their people was, in effect, that they could continue the war—a flagrant lie—but that they wished to avoid further bloodshed and destruction.

Thus was Japan's humanitarianism born. There is reason to hope and to believe, however, that what was originally a step-child of necessity will ultimately become a progenitor of Oriental democracy and peace.

US MC

## Base Plate McGurk . . .

# Imagination Pays Off

NOW THE OLD MAN IS A NUT ON THIS FITNESS report proposition and requires all of his captains to submit recommended marks on all of the lieutenants in the battalion. He maintains that not only is it good practice for us, but also it requires us to observe and get to know all of the officers junior to us in the outfit instead of only those in our respective companies. All of this, he says, tends to make our reports and opinions on our own officers fairer and freer from prejudice. By sad experience we have all found that it is best to put plenty of time and thought on making out these reports since the old man is not in the least adverse to ordering intra-battalion transfers. For instance, one time I put in an "unsat" on a bird in another company and an "outstanding" on Joe McGee who was my favorite drinking partner and who, incidentally, has the best looking blonde this side of the Rockies for a sister. Within a week I had the "unsat" bird in my company, and Joe was in Baker Company. As luck would have it, my "unsat" turned out to be an excellent officer who really had more on the ball than Joe. Furthermore, Joe really had to work like a beaver to get a "Very Good" out of Pappy O'Hara who, being a family man with two "house-apes" and a "long haired bunkie," wasn't a bit interested in Joe's social assets.

Anyway, we were all sitting around with our beers moaning about how unreasonable the old man was about this deal when Tim Mahoney brought up the subject of imagination.

"What a wonderful thing it is for an officer to have imagination," Tim remarked. "I remember well the trouble we were having trying to keep the men from throwing away their gas masks as soon as they hit the beach. Then up comes this young replacement lieutenant with the idea that if we secured the mask to the combat pack in the same position that the lower pack normally rides when it is carried, then the man wouldn't throw his mask away since, instead of it holding out his left wing like a penguin, it would be out of his way and no trouble to carry. Well, it worked swell, and I congratulated the lad for using his imagination. However, when it came time to make out his fitness report there was no place to really show this except under 'remarks.' Now I feel that imagination should be listed up there in paragraph nine just as much as 'intelligence' or 'judgment and common sense.'"

"Well maybe so," Stan remarked, "but I can go you one better on this imagination deal. My story has to do with using the snooperscope and sniperscope for more than just snooping and sniping.

"By the time we had finished the Saipan and Tinian shows we all felt that we had better start putting more emphasis on night operations. Incidentally, you'll remember that this turned out to be true on Iwo and particularly on Okinawa. Well, anyway, the big problem was, of course, control. We use to sit around and try to think of new ways and means by which we could control a battalion or even a company for that matter, in a night attack. Finally some one came up with the idea that we could use infra-red light as a means for showing the unit's location and by a redistribution of the SCR 536s in the battalion we could increase the communication tie-in for the two assault companies at least. On checking what equipment we had available for this deal, we found that in the battalion we had fifty infra-red filters that fit on the regular flashlight, we had one metascope, and we had nine snooperscopes. Now the flashlight with filter can send but it cannot receive, the metascope can receive but it cannot send, and the snooperscope can both send and receive infra-red light. We also had twenty SCR 536s, but since they were set on three different frequencies it was necessary to have some overlapping, or, in other words, a few commanders would have to carry two SCR 536s on different frequencies.

"Now I'm not going into all the details as to just how we distributed this gear, as it would require too much time and probably one or two simple charts for you geniuses to understand it. However, here is the general picture as to how we set this deal up. We used the old two forward and one back formation all the way down the line. Two companies abreast, each company with two platoons in the assault and one in support, each assault platoon with two squads in the assault and one in support. That, of course, gave us four platoons or eight squads abreast. The squads traveled in squad column with about a fifty yard interval between squads. In other words, we planned to attack on a battalion frontage of about three hundred and fifty yards. The

support platoons, machine gun platoons, mortar section, reserve company, etc., all used the closed column formation.

"All of the squads in the four assault platoons were given a flashlight with a filter and a SCR 536 radio. Each of the four assault platoon leaders and all of the rifle company commanders were equipped with snooperscopes and SCR 536s. The remaining filters, metascope, snooperscopes, and radios were distributed throughout the battalion, but it isn't necessary to go into that.

"Simple signals were assigned to each unit. For instance, the first platoon would signal a dash. The second squad of the first platoon would signal two dots and one dash, the third squad, three dots and one dash, and so on."



The snooperscope can both send and receive infrared signals.

"Okay, now do you all have the picture up to this point?" Stan asked.

"One thing I'd like to ask," Johnny spoke up, "did you plan to use any of the normal control methods in addition to this infra-red scheme?"

"Thanks, Johnny," Stan smiled. "I should have mentioned that at the first. Yes, we used all of the normal techniques such as prior reconnaissance, compass courses for all units including the squads, etc. However, we did not have a rehearsal.

"Now if there are no more questions, I'll continue. The terrain we picked had two rather deep but narrow cross compartments. The only trees were in the bottom of these ravines. The direction of attack was across these cross compartments, and the distance from the line of departure to the objective was about three hundred yards."

"Get on with your tale," Tim growled. "We're not interested in your terrain appreciation or tactics. Did this infra-red light system help your control, or didn't it?"

"It was amazing, Timmy," Stan smiled. "All hands equipped with the filters and the snooperscopes, in other words the sending equipment, were required to flash their identification signal directly to their rear every two minutes. In this way, the officer with the receiving equipment, or as I said the metascope and the snooperscopes, could tell exactly where each unit was. By means of the radio, a platoon commander could tell a squad to hold it up, move faster, bear right or left or whatever was needed. The same applied to the company commanders in controlling their platoons and the battalion commander in controlling his battalion. I was traveling with the old man, and as I said, it was amazing. When looking through the snooperscope the whole battalion zone of action was covered with lights signalling, and you could see where each company was easy as could be. On the other hand, when not looking through the snooperscope, the area was as black as the ace of spades.

"About a week later we ran the same show over the same terrain, except this time we picked a second objective about three hundred yards from the first objective, giving us a distance to travel of about six hundred and fifty yards in all. This second objective was a ridge, and on it we posted some officers with a snooperscope to see if our signals could be picked up as we moved forward."

"Now wait a minute, Stan," Tim broke in. "As I understand it, the maximum range of a snooperscope is about seventy yards under ideal conditions. By ideal conditions, I mean over perfectly clear terrain like a football field. How could a snooperscope about six hundred yards away pick up your signals?"

"What you're referring to as the maximum range is the maximum distance at which an object or person is discernible," Stan answered. "However, the snooperscope can pick up an infra-red light at well over six hundred yards, and remember, we were using the scope strictly for its ability to send and receive infra-red light and not for the specific purpose for which it was invented."

"Well, what's to keep the enemy from having a bunch of gadgets that can receive infra-red and dropping the works on you as soon as you start signalling?" Tim asked.

"Nothing except this," Stan said, "infra-red light is very directional. In other words, if the light is not pointed almost directly at you, you cannot pick it up with any of our present equipment. Therefore, as long as troops signal only to the rear it is impossible to pick

up the light. That is why this group was unable to spot any signals at any time from their position on the second objective."

"Probably wouldn't work at that range," Tim muttered stubbornly.

"Don't be such a hammerhead," Stan growled. "Naturally before we started the problem we experimented on that. They could pick up our signal from the line of departure very clearly, and we could pick up their signal as long as the light was directed towards us.

"Anyway, here's my point. Obviously this infra-red deal has a lot of possibilities in the recognition field as well as the control angle for all kinds of night operations. For instance, carrying parties, patrols, wire teams, messengers, etc., could be easily identified by this means. In short, I feel that it would give us much more freedom of movement at night. The Navy has been using infra-red for identification and signaling purposes for years now. I certainly don't think that the snooperscope is the answer, but I do feel that a suitable sending and receiving instrument could be easily developed for the use of the ground troops."

"Not for me, Brother," Tim said. "I'll do my fighting in the day time. When it gets dark I'm for getting in that old fox hole and shooting anything that moves."

"I hope you're kidding, Tim," Stan said seriously, "because that practice hurt us plenty in the last war and will be fatal in the next. What with the tremendous improvements in our weapons and techniques I think we may find that we'll be digging-in during daylight and waiting for darkness to carry out our fighting, supplying, evacuating, and just about the bulk of our movement."

"I agree with you," Johnny said, "and I think you've got something there with your use of infra-red. Furthermore, I think the whole set-up showed plenty of imagination, and as I remember it, that's what started this discussion. However, there are simpler things than working out a new control system for a night attack that can be accomplished if an officer uses a little imagination. For instance, some bird thought up the idea of having some sandbags in every LVT to throw on any grenades the enemy was able to lob in. We filled the bags about two-thirds full and three or four men were designated to handle them in each LVT. We tried it first at Tarawa and again at Saipan. It worked very well and probably saved several lives.

**The metascope can receive, but can not send.**

**An infrared flashlight can send, but cannot receive.**

"We could sit around all night and think of hundreds of examples. However, the original point was that there is not enough importance attached to imagination being a necessary characteristic of a good officer. It's all too easy for us to read the book and assume that that is the final word. Even in reading the book you'll find one officer who can apply what the book says to a particular situation by using a little imagination, and you'll find another officer who will try to make the situation fit the book because he refuses or is afraid to use his imagination."

"Well, what can we do about it?" Tim asked.

"My suggestion is this," Stan said. "First, let's all encourage our lieutenants to use their imagination by stressing its importance, by never ridiculing any of their ideas no matter how impractical they sound, and by freely complimenting them whenever they think up a new training technique or aid, a new system of keeping their dope on their platoons, a new leadership technique or anything else that indicates that some imagination has been employed on their part. Second, in preparing these recommended marks for their fitness reports let's include under "Remarks" if the officer has either more or less than the normal amount of imagination. And last, let's all of us get off of our "base plates" and start using a little imagination in the way we administer our companies, train our troops, and handle our men."

US MC

# Marines in the Pacific War

## Chapter 20

### PELELIU, THE HARDEST BATTLE

By Fletcher Pratt

OUR CARRIER AIR STRENGTH HAD SO GROWN BY THE end of August 1944 that an operation in any direction could be contemplated, even if that expedition had to meet at its point of impact the combined land and sea-based air forces of the Empire, covering the counter-attack of their Combined Fleet. We had the techniques for making good a landing on any hostile shore and we had (one of the little-noted but most important developments of the war) discovered how to support amphibious operations at an oceanic distance from base by means of logistic echelons afloat. We had the Marianas, which are almost equidistant from the whole circle of key points in the enemy's rackrent Empire—metropolitan Japan on the north, the Ryukyus and Formosa to the northwest, the Philippines directly west, Celebes, Helmahera, and the outer tip of New Guinea to the southwest—which is to say we had interior lines and could hurl the massive force of the Pacific Fleet against any one of those points before it could be reinforced from the others.

The question was where to strike. Adms Nimitz, Spruance the strategic brain, McMorris the memory and logician, all would have undoubtedly preferred the direct thrust west to cut among the Ryukyus, the dangling life-cord to the southward. But the days of island-hopping in the old sense were now past. All the points open to attack shared two characteristics—they were within mutually supporting distances of one another, that is none could be isolated by fleet operations alone, as the Marianas had been isolated; and they consisted of land masses larger than any the Marines had yet attacked.* Both characteristics, and the combination of the two, placed a requirement on the attack; it must contemplate a land campaign of continental dimensions after the beachhead had been secured. The pure amphibious phase of the war was ended; from Guam forth every major campaign must bear the stamp of Guam, with a beachhead force securing the beachhead and troops who need not be specialists in such work pouring through their perimeter for inland operations.

The requirement was for troops. Now of the Navy's private army, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Marine Divisions had been in action among the Marianas and would not be ready, except in emergency, for another campaign till several months had passed. In the same state was the Provisional Brigade, now being erected into a new 6th Division down on Guadalcanal, with its organization still incomplete. The 5th had been organized, but was in Hawaii, still incompletely trained; the 1st was under MacArthur's command and he was showing no disposition to release it save for purposes that served his own strategic ends. Of the Army divisions that were operating under Central Pacific, that is, Navy Command, the 27th and 77th, like the Marine divisions, needed rest and recruitment; the 96th was green and Adm Nimitz could hardly look forward to making a major expedition with the 7th Division, the only one at the moment both experienced and available.

All the other soldiers of the Army of the United States were either busy beating out the Germans' brains in France or under the command of Gen Douglas MacArthur. Troop availability thus formed a limiting condition which practically imposed a Navy operation conjointly with that able, strong-minded and difficult officer. This meant that the operation would only be the return to the Philippines toward which MacArthur had bent every effort during three years of war. Nimitz brought Halsey up to command the major sea forces, giving them the name Third Fleet (though they were the same ships that had sailed under Spruance as Fifth Fleet) and the staffs began to look at their maps.

The moment they did that it was clear we would need an air base and an anchorage nearer to the Philippines

*New Britain excepted; but as indicated above the interior communications of New Britain were so bad that in effect it was not so much a large land mass as a series of small islands.

Part XVIII: Two hours after H-hour, Marine lines were only 50 yards deep. One platoon got caught in a tank trap and was evacuated. Company K lost half its men taking a blockhouse, and nearly out of ammunition faced a counterattack

than Saipan. The islands to be attacked are an oceanic distance from the Marianas (Manila-Guam, 1,500 sea miles, reads the track chart) and however efficient our floating docks had become, one could not expect to tow a battle-damaged ship that distance. There was also the question of getting some land-based air over the Philippines and a forward strip, or a couple of them, were needed for light bombers. Finally there was the question of the Western Carolines themselves.

CINCPOA AND MACARTHUR HEADQUARTERS knew a good deal about Japanese bases by that time, thanks to the enemy's incurable habit of leaving documents around for our people to mull over after they had taken one of those islands and his equally incurable failure to devise ciphers that would amuse our cryptographers for more than a couple of hours. Yap was a major base, and strongly held—8,000 men, which in its much smaller area made it a bigger Tarawa. Ulithi had only about a battalion, could be taken nearly as easily as Majuro in the Marshalls, and like that atoll, would serve admirably as an anchorage for the units of the train. Palau is a queer formation, a series of volcanic islands inside a coral reef, 77 miles long, 20 wide, the most important being the island of Babelthuap; economically valuable for its phosphates and aluminum ore; the natives had the quaint habit of eating their grandmothers. It was the strongest of all, fortified to the eye teeth, a much more powerful base in reputation and in fact than mysterious Truk. Intelligence estimated (it may be said now, correctly) that there were not many fewer than 40,000 troops to hold the place, and for a long time after Spruance's big raid on Truk it had been the favorite anchorage of the Japanese fleet.

The plan was to take all three—Yap, Ulithi, and Palau. The reason for including the last was that no one on our side yet knew how badly the Japanese fleet had been hit in the June battles. *Shokaku* and *Taiho* had not been seen to go down. It was expected that *Hayataka* would be repaired as well as *Ryuho* and at least one, maybe two, of the six new Japanese carriers would be ready. That is, interference from a Japanese fleet with eight combat carriers could be counted upon. Halsey's own fleet contained 16 (eight of them light carriers) but the proportion was less important than the existence of a Japanese fleet capable of conducting ocean operations. Such a fleet could strike a dangerous blow, especially if they woke up to the fact that they could damage an amphibian expedition more by hitting its supply ships than by going for the fighting vessels. While they still had the well protected anchorage in the Palaus it would be possible for them to emerge from some point on the circle of Empire, hit our train, then lodge in security at the Palau base, as they could not at Ulithi. In military terms Palau was too well fortified a base to leave in our rear.

It would not be necessary to take the whole atoll or to deal with all the 40,000 troops it held in order to neutralize the place. A fairly small island, Augaur, lies outside the reef at its southern end and had a garrison of only 2,000-odd. Just inside the atoll Peleliu Island possessed a big airfield and a garrison variously stated as 4,500 and 10,000. Take these two, set up a fighter strip on Augaur, sweep out the mines in Kossol Passage which led to the anchorage at the north end of the atoll, and it would be unnecessary to touch Babelthuap or its 26-30,000 men.

This was the plan, with the Army 81st Division to take Angaur and Rupertus' 1st Marine Division Peleliu, while other forces of the MacArthur comand fell on Morotai Island, north of Helmahera. From these, air cover for the Philippine invasion could be provided, while to cover our rear the 7th and 96th Divisions would seize Yap. Target date for these preliminary island invasions was 15 September; that for the big campaign, the return to the Philippines, was early spring of 1945.

The fleet movements that accompanied this plan were intricate. Halsey was to come down from the north with Mitscher's fast carriers and Lee's fast battleships for a strike at Ulithi, Yap, Palau in order, then push on to cover against a possible emergence from the Philippines of the Japanese fleet against the advance of MacArthur's convoy to Morotai. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet would take over the protection of the Morotai operation while Halsey swung north along the range of the Philippines, putting heavy carrier strikes on the fields there to keep Jap air from interfering with operations at Morotai or Palau, then run farther north to catch whatever aerial reinforcements would be staging down the Ryukyus. Behind Halsey the old battleships and escort carriers under Adm Oldendorf would meanwhile have convoyed the attack units to Peleliu and Angaur and covered their advance across the beaches. The two divisions for Yap would come in a later convoy, Halsey's run to the north interposing between them and any source of Japanese interference. By time they reached that island Oldendorf's force should be through with the Palaus and would furnish support.*

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*Halsey's fleet—it was the one that fought the battle for Leyte Gulf, so deserves recording—consisted of Task Force 38.1, RearAdm J. J. McCain—carriers *Wasp, Hornet, Cowpens, Monterey;* heavy cruisers *Wichita, Boston, Canberra;* destroyers *Izard, Charrette, Conner, Bell, Burns, Boyd, Bradford, Brown, Cowell, Farenhelt, McCalla, Grayson:* Task Group 38.2 RearAdm C. F. Bogan—carriers *Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Cabot, Independence;* battleships *Iowa, New Jersey;* light cruisers *Vincennes, Houston, Miami, San Diego, Oakland;* destroyers *Owens, Millers, The Sullivans, Stephen Potter, Tingey, Hickox, Hunt, Lewis Mancock, Marshall, Cushing, Colahan, Halsey Powell, Uhlmann, Yarrall, Twining, Stockham, Wedderburn, Benham;* Task Group 38.3 RearAdm F. C. Sherman—carriers *Essex, Enterprise, Langley, Princeton;* bat-

When, after the fall of the Marshalls, it was decided that the Palaus were the most likely objective of the next major American attack, the Imperial General Staff granted them top priority on construction material and troops. Both Field Marshall Terauchi, who commanded the whole Southern Area from the Philippines, and Adm Toyoda (who will be remembered as Koga's successor at the head of the Combined Fleet) were very much concerned with the place, which represented for the one his surest bastion against an American movement on the Philippines, and for the other his best forward fleet base. They saw that the priorities were actually carried out in spite of difficulties from American submarines. In charge of Palau-Yap-Ulithi, together named "The Palau Sector Group" they placed LtGen Sadea Inoue, one of their very best men.

He seems to have arrived in the Palaus during March, while the command question was being settled. When the attack on Saipan and the Battle of the Philippine Sea made it improbable that Palau would be used by the fleet in the immediate future, he could and did make his defensive dispositions without reference to the Navy. The General perceived his problem as that of arranging a defense which would inflict crippling losses on the American forces, leave them incapable, even if they took the islands, of undertaking another major operation for months, during which months the Japanese fleet and air force could recover. That is, it was a case of trading an island or two for time, fortifications for blood, a small command for the shattering of a great one.

The Saipan reports, which were very detailed since Navy Capt Sawaguchi and a couple of Army observers had escaped by submarine during the last days, gave Gen Inoue a basis on which to proceed. His first step was to withdraw from Ulithi, an atoll of featureless flat islands, where adequate defensive installations against the violent American gunfire could not be constructed. The next was to draw up a document entitled "Palau Sector Group Training for Victory." The title is rather flambuoyant and "spiritual discipline" was placed first on the list of requirements with the remark that "we must first resolutely penetrate to the enemy and then we shall display our short swords and slash to the very marrow of his bones." But from this point on the paper demonstrates why Inoue was considered one of the major officers of his service.

ALL PERSONNEL, all tanks, all guns, the General prescribed, must be kept underground in positions of "absolute security" during the American bombardment, with special attention given to communications equipment, whose wires were to be well dug in. Units must be prepared to act independently in support of the general plan should communications fail. It would be most advantageous to repel landing craft before their arrival at the beach by means of strongly prepared beach positions, but we cannot hope to accomplish this. Therefore we must not open fire prematurely on his boats, but wait till his first wave has reached the beach and then counterattack, firing at the same time on the boats of the enemy's support wave, not allowing him to organize his formations ashore. A major counterattack must be launched the very first night with all reserve units and troops from sectors not under immediate attack, to take advantage of the enemy's insecure bridgehead. At the same time a counterlanding force in boats must boldly tail the enemy's boats and going ashore in his rear, attack his command and communications centers.

"Without concerning ourselves with the great explosive bursts or the strong local effect of naval firing, the destructive power wrought upon personnel is not so very great against men who are advancing at a crawl, utilizing natural objects and shell holes, especially when we consider that originally the object of naval guns was to sink ships and that their shells possess the special quality of traveling in a low line. Aerial bombardment is almost identical. By observing very carefully the activity of enemy planes and the bombs while they are falling, thereby avoiding instantaneous explosions, and by taking advantage of gaps in bombardment in order to advance, it can cause no great damage. The only fearful thing is the psychological effects upon ignorant personnel. This must be impressed upon the minds of everyone.

"Daring penetration by counterattack forces must utilize surprising power developed by instant concentration of all types of ordnance. It is certain that if we repay the Americans (who rely solely on material power) with material power it will shock them beyond imagination. It is most urgent that we prepare secretly and take the enemy by surprise by concentrating all material power against one sector.

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tleships *Washington, Massachusetts, Indiana, South Dakota, Alabama;* light cruisers *Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile, Reno;* destroyers *Clarence Bronson, Cotten, Dortch, Gatling, Healey, Cogswell, Caperton, Ingersoll, Knapp, Porterfield, Callaghan, Cassin Young, Irvin, Preston, Longshaw, Morrison, Prichett;* Task Group 38.4 RearAdm R. E. Davison—carriers *Lexington, Franklin, Belleau Wood, San Jacinto;* heavy cruiser *New Orleans;* light cruiser *Biloxi;* destroyers *Maury, Craven, Gridley, Helm, McCall, Mugford, Ralph Talbot, Patterson, Bagley, Wilkes, Nicholson, Swanson.* Oldendorf's command had the battleships *Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Idaho, Mississippi;* the heavy cruisers *Indianapolis, Portland, Minneapolis, Louisville;* light cruisers *Cleveland, Columbia, Denver, Honolulu;* destroyers *A. W. Grant, Bennett, Bennion, Bryant, Fullam, Guest, Halford, Hudson, H. L. Edwards, Leutze, Newcomb, Robinson, Ross, R. F. Leary;* with the escort carrier group of RearAdm Oftsie containing the escort carriers *Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island, Ommaney Bay;* destroyers *McCord, Trathen, Heerman, Hoel, Thorne;* escort carriers *Sargent Bay, Petroff Bay, Kalinin Bay, Saginaw Bay, Cambier Bay, Kitkun Bay, White Plains;* and destroyers *Haggard, Hailey, Johnston, Welles, Claxton, Aulick, Cony, Sigourney.*


PELELIU
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**Rocket-firing LCIs cease their bombardment of Peleliu on D-Day, 15 September 1944, as the 1st Marine Division aboard amphtracs, heads for the beach and one of the toughest fights of the war.**

"If the situation becomes bad we will maintain a firm hold on the high ground and prevent the enemy from establishing or using an airbase by a daring guerrilla warfare with our ordnance weapons."

IN IMPLEMENTING this program of defense, so different from the usual Japanese doctrine of save the beach line and you save all, Gen Inoue made the error of placing his strongest forces on Babelthuap, under the impression that the Americans must sooner or later attack it, but this was almost the only mistake he did make. Angaur was outside the atoll, flat and not very rugged, it received a single battalion of infantry, four tanks and a battery of artillery—2,100 men all told. Peleliu, which is what chiefly concerns us, had a major-general, Kenjiro Murai, commanding a force that totaled close to 11,000, the most important elements being the 2d Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 15th Infantry, a battalion of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade, a naval guard force, and a battalion of tanks. The majority of these belonged to the 14th Division, of which Inoue was the unit commander. It was a good, old division, formed at the time of the Russian War and with a tradition of continuous service; it made the Hankow campaign and spent four years in Manchuria. It was thoroughly trained, even at crawling forward under bombing, the General having used the casual American air raids on his islands during the summer for this purpose. He placed an urgent requisition with Marshal Terauchi for 300 collapsible rubber boats for his counter-landing force, but there do not seem to have been that many available in the Philippine command and a ship bringing down more from Japan unfortunately ran afoul of an American submarine.

The big airfield lies at the southern end of Peleliu (whose form it is a waste of time to describe except by means of a map) and had been erected out of what was essentially jungle swamp. All along the western face of the beach below it, to a lesser extent along the eastern shore, the most likely places for an American landing, coconut log cradles, concrete tetrahedrons and barbed-wire systems were strewn from the reef-edge in, mingled with mines, both of the controlled and contact types. There were more mines on the beach itself, below high water mark. Inland, the roads were all mined with 100-pound aerial bombs, and so were all the defiles in the old coral worn to limestone which constitutes the structural bulk of the island. The only direct antiboat defenses were on Ngaramoked Island off the southern tip of Peleliu, on a little island just north of it and on a point just before the west coast turns northeast—in each case 37s or 75s in concrete pillboxes heavy enough to be impervious to bombing.

The General regarded it as of the greatest importance

**A Marine, rifle smoking from the charge, lobs a grenade over the ridge into the enemy positions.**

to keep the American tanks from forming and advancing with the help of their infantry. All his beaches had therefore been extensively tank-trapped with systems of ditches and mined obstacles two or three deep. In view of the tactics Americans had used against such obstacles on Saipan (which were for their infantry to work through the obstacle system while the tanks covered them with fire) the General placed machine-gun pillboxes in the flanks of the tank traps themselves, where they could not be hit except by a tank actually in the trap.

The most original feature of the defense system was with relation to the ridge running the length of the northeast-southwest peninsula of the island, which the Japs called Momiji Plateau. It had a system of natural caves and crevices; from the hour of his arrival Gen Inoue worked at extending and developing them. In them he placed all his artillery except his beach guns, all his heavy mortars and the launchers for the new 200mm rockets recently received from the Empire. By the end of August there were over 500 such caves. Most of them were connected by interior tunnels; nearly all had entrances on more than one level and on both sides of the plateau. Many had up to five or six stories, dipping and winding from the entrances to keep gunfire from coming in, with living quarters branching off and another set of exits branching off from these, so that if the top of the ridge had been removed they would be in the shape of an H lying down, or several Es back to back and end to end.

IN THE MOUTHS of these caves the guns had protected firing positions; whenever time and material could be had these were fitted with sliding armored doors, opening semi-automatically for long enough to permit the gun to shoot. All the caves had along their side passages rifle slits that might be natural crevices, very hard to locate from outside. The bulk of the artillery in them was arranged to keep constant fire both on the main airfield and the minor airfield on Ngesebus to the north, connected to Peleliu by a causeway. The guns were not arranged in battery but individually; each was assigned a specific type target or an area on which to fire and all were carefully calibrated for that type of firing.

The General issued seven separate counterattack plans, the one to be used depending upon where the Americans landed. All the men were carefully trained in each plan; unit commanders were examined upon them to make certain they knew precisely where they were to employ their troops in each. A system of flag and flare signals was arranged so that even if the normal methods of communication were destroyed, all would be advised of the proper moment for counterattack and of which plan would be used.

On 13 August a report came in from Guam that the seriously wounded had been disposed of and only one last battle remained to be fought there. A lieutenant in a machine-cannon company wrote that he could not help feeling the same fate was closing in on those in the Palau Sector. It was one month later, 12 September, when in the darkness before dawn, the roar of American airplane motors was heard and the antiaircraft men went to their positions as a pale moon rode down the sky. No sooner were the guns ready than a naval bombardment from the south began. All hands were ordered under concrete; the firing continued so fiercely until 1800 that no one could even lift up his head. Word was passed through the caves that the enemy had planned landing. As it happened Gen Murai was visiting Babelthuap for a conference; Col Nakagawa of the 2d Regiment assumed command.

## III

THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION contained 17,400 men and had the support of four Marine and two Army amphtrac battalions, with 2,352 more, plus a couple of independent artillery battalions, 1,222 more. The plan was to land the three infantry regiments abreast on the western face of the island, fronting the airfield. The 7th Regiment of Col Herman H. Hanneken (we met him on Guadal) was to go in across the southernmost beach on a one-battalion front, swing right, clear out Ngara-

**Working at top speed, a Marine 155 howitzer crew reloads before the smoke of the last round has cleared. Two artillery battalions reinforced the 1st Marine Division during the Peleliu operation.**

moked and the southern tip of Peleliu, holding one battalion in division reserve. This assignment should be complete by the night of D day. The 5th (Col Harold D. Harris) on a two-battalion front to push right across the airfield and beyond to clean out everything in the low ground of the main body of the island. It should be all around the airfield by twilight of D day and push across it the next morning. The 1st, two battalions abreast, should take the most northerly beach, capture the outlying points from which the beachhead might be swept by fire, anchoring the flank for the first night, then left wheel and ascend from two directions the ridge on the island's long peninsula. D plus 1 should find it on the ridge. This was Col Lewis B. Puller's regiment.

There had been growling at Pavuvu about shortages, the eternal cry of war—not enough water, spare parts, amphtracs, flame throwers for proper training; but all that was now past and forgotten as the LSTs lined up off Peleliu on the morning of 15 September with amphtracs spewing from their jaws. Out beyond, other ships stretched away as far as the eye could follow; battleships and cruisers out in the dim, a sight which had rendered the Japanese lieutenant of machine-cannon "so furious I could feel the blood pounding in my veins throughout my body." Overhead arched the fire of the big ships; the concussion of their guns shook the landing craft in the water as though by an undersea earthquake and gusts of heat rushed past. Ashore their missiles burst in bright red balls of flame from which smoke ran up in swift spirals to form little questionmark-shaped clouds. Nearly all the vegetation was down or damaged, there had been no fire from the shore in three days of shooting and ten of bombing, and how could anyone live under that?

THE NAVY MEN said it would be another Roi-Namur; Adm Oldendorf actually reported all important installations had been destroyed and one of the transport commanders remarked to Col Puller as the latter went over the side; "Coming back for supper?"

The Colonel paused. "Why?"

"Everything's done over there. You'll walk in."

"If you think it's that easy why don't you come on the beach at five o'clock, have supper with me and pick up a few souvenirs," replied Puller a trifle grimly.

He did not believe that many Japs were dead and the lieutenant of machine cannon agreed with him, noting meticulously in his diary that although the scenery of Peleliu was completely altered only one man in his company had been slightly injured. It was probably not much different in the other caves, as the Marines discovered when they got across the reef-line 700 yards out under a clear, bright day. The first wave of amph-

tracs hit the beach at 0832 through small arms fire; as though its arrival were a signal the guns on point and island opened, many of those back in the ridge and a mortar barrage so heavy that those who lived through it said it was the worst they had ever seen. Amphtracs and DUKWs were hit all across the shelf area and sank or drifted burning while marines strove to wade ashore. The guns on the island north from Ngaramoked were particularly deadly with their enfilade, cut up the right flank of the 7th badly and produced confusion among platoons and companies reaching the beach.

Out in the offing of the heavy cruiser *Portland* they watched through glasses as a steel shutter in the limestone ridge opened to let a gun fire down on the beach; threw in five full salvoes of 8-inch fire and after each, saw the gun fire again. "You can put all the steel in Pittsburgh on to that thing and not get it," said the cruiser's gunnery officer.

Down on the beach of the 1st Marines one platoon got involved in a tank trap with fire coming from three sides and had to be evacuated. Company K became isolated from the regiment, took the blockhouse on the point at the cost of more than half its personnel and was nearly out of ammunition, food and water by noon, with prospects of a counterattack coming up. By 1000 the lines were nowhere much deeper than 50 yards, though the reserve battalions had been committed earlier. Shells continued to drop on the beaches where men were trying to unload supplies—unpredictably, unfuriatingly, without rhyme or reason, though it might have been a good deal worse had Japs concentrated their fires.

Nor must it be imagined that the 50 yard gain before noon was won against artillery alone. Japanese infantry was everywhere; Company K of the 1st killed more of them than the number of men lost at the blockhouse on the point. The odd thing, the new thing, was what these Japs were all attacking, coming forward. They were as yet only the local efforts of local garrisons at our beachhead lines; but about noon one of the Jap guns fired a series of the flares they called Red Dragons and air observers noted signs of movement in the interior of the island. The Red Dragons were in fact the signal for putting into effect Gen Inoue's counterattack plan Number One, which prescribed that all troops should be withdrawn from Ngesebus and from positions east of the airfield, these forces being added to the mobile reserve via the tunnels through Momiji Plateau for a major counterattack. It was ready to move at 1630 and Col Nakagawa must have thought highly of its chances, for at this hour the 1st Division's line was nowhere more than 200 yards in, had many gaps, and was far short of the airfield. The attack had in it all the tanks the Japs could muster, about 13; two infantrymen rode behind each on a curious drum lashed to its rear, and more swarmed over the ground behind, leaping and crawling.

THE POINT OF IMPACT could not have been better chosen had the Japs been furnished with our operations orders, for the spearhead of the thrust fell exactly on the joint between 1st and 5th Regiments, where there had already been difficulties about liaison. Many of the riding and following infantry were cut down by small arms fire but the tanks broke right through and turned south to the beachhead where one was blown up by a bazooka just as it opened fire on the evacuation station for wounded. Fortunately for our side, five of the eight marine tanks that had reached the beach in this area were still intact, waiting in defilade for the infantry to move on with them. They turned on these mechanical enemies with appreciation, and the Jap "medium" tank is only a rather under-armored light by comparison with a Sherman. There was a sharp, crashing tank-to-tank fight over the heads of the marines cowering in their fox holes, the only one of its kind in the war. Jap 37 mm tore the treads from one of ours and bent out of shape the gun of another; but every time the American 75s hit a Jap they made a 12-inch hole and the second shell burned them out. The crippled American got no less than six; when the fight was over all 13 Japs were destroyed and all the men in Nakagawa's attack wave were dead.

That was the crisis; hearts lifted all along the line, the beachhead that had half an hour before seemed so precarious was made good. By twilight the division had reached a line 3,000 yards long and some 300 yards deep, except south of the airfield, where the 7th and part of the 5th had run deeper. Most of the Japs had withdrawn toward their ridge, which the Marines were already calling "Bloody Nose." The casualties in our lines were 1,298, over 10 per cent of the troops ashore, for of the artillery it had been possible to land only one battalion of 105s and one and a half of 75s, which were firing from the midst of the infantry, their gunners much troubled by snipers. Everything was far behind schedule. The Jap lieutenant of machine-cannon was dead and his diary being read at our headquarters.

## IV

ALL NIGHT the Japs tried infiltrations under the flares and star shells, according to plan, but these attacks did not come off very well, Nakagawa had lost too many men in the tank attack and did not wish to jeopardize his ridge position by committing all his reserves to mobile warfare. Moreover it had developed that the plan for counterattack Number One had a defect. It had been based on the assumption that a landing on the western beaches would be accompanied by one on

**Marine infantrymen move around a halftrack as they advance against Japanese pillboxes concealed in a labyrinth of caves and undergrowth on Peleliu. Well fortified positions made the going tough.**

Ngaramoked and the southern tip of Peleliu. Thus, though the troops from other unattacked sectors had been drawn into Momiji Plateau those in the southern area (a couple of battalions) had remained where they were. They were now isolated, out of communication and with no plan.

This brought it about that on 16 September, D plus 1, there were no more counterattacks and the 5th was able to heave right across the airfield. They had to do it fast because mortar and artillery shells from the ridge kept dropping on them. The 7th had hard, slow going against the isolated battalions, who were well underground; the 1st gained almost nothing along the approaches to Bloody Nose. It had come on very hot that morning; between the weather, water shortage, the sleepless night and constant fire, all the men were suffering much from exhaustion, but they found time to laugh at a Jap propaganda leaflet, which is worth reproducing as an example of what the Oriental mind thinks American minds are like:

> "American brave soldiers!
>
> "We think you much pity since landing on this ileland. In spit of your pitiful battle we are sorry that we can present only fire, not even good water. We soon will attack strongly your Army. You have done bravely your duty.
>
> "Now, abandon your guns, and come in Japanese military with white flag (or handkerchief), so we will be glad to see you and welcome you comfortably as we can well."

(That day also was a key date out on the ocean, far from the struggling Marines. Bull Halsey had run his great sweep up the flank of the Philippines and had discovered the fact till then concealed, of Japanese weakness in land based air. Messages flashed to Pearl Harbor; Halsey flew down to see MacArthur, who had found Morotai a pushover. It had been intended that one of the fast carrier groups should go on to cover the Yap

attack after Peleliu, but it was already evident that the Marines on the latter island would need more support. What if the Yap landing were cancelled? What if the two divisions for it were loaned to the MacArthur command? Would he not be willing to move on the Philippines immediately instead of after the turn of the year? Yes, said MacArthur.)

That was the 16th, then. By digging-in time that night, it was already clear that it would require much harder fighting than was originally expected in order to secure the vital ridge north of the airfield. Still there was nothing to do now but make the best of the plan as it stood, and the artillery being now in a position to fire support, a general assault was launched next morning. The 1st gained 500 yards, right up to the slope of Bloody Nose; the 5th got a little town north of the airfield and the 7th all its southern peninsula and most of Ngaramoked. The last regiment completed its business on the following day, 18 September, though not until one battalion of 155s just going into position was forced to reverse direction and fire at 3-500 yards, while a 105 battery lost all its guns to mortar fire and had to fight as infantry. The 18th also saw the 5th complete its job of overrunning the low ground beyond the airfield and the small islands that lie offshore on that side.

THE REST OF the battle of Peleliu was all Bloody Nose and a bloody business it proved. There was no room for maneuver, there was no story to tell but that of men climbing up vertical faces and working on those cave mouths by hand with flame thrower and satchel charge while the Japs sniped from their rifle slits. Tanks were used freely but they got hit too—25 of them lost all told, about half to mines or rather to the combination of mines and mortars, for as soon as the Japs saw a tank in trouble they put a mortar barrage on it. Artillery afloat and ashore was used; planes bombed and strafed, but it was only by accident that any of these weapons achieved the necessary direct hit.

The heat was sweltering, the water supply short; 1st Marines lost 56 per cent of their numbers (more than that in the combat infantry) before they were pulled out on 23 September with the advance at a standstill.* By that date the whole of the 7th Regiment had been fed into the battle for Bloody Nose, one battalion at a time and some 1st Division officers wished to put the 5th in also, but Gen Geiger of III Corps brought over instead the 321st Army Regiment of the 81st Division from Angaur, which had been easily conquered.

That night, the 23rd, Gen Inoue from Babelthuap tried his counterlanding as a reinforcement from the inside of the lagoon, with a little fleet of barges. On the previous night three such barges had come down alone, were seen and driven ashore by artillery fire, so the larger move was not altogether a surprise. Destroyers from the offing fired star shell, under which Marine artillery took the barges under fire while armored amphtracs from the 5th Regiment's area charged into the water in direct counterattack. All the barges were sooner or later sunk or wrecked on the beach, but the low-lying craft made uncertain targets in poor light and several hundred Japs got ashore on the rocky northern tip of the island, immediately disappearing into the cave system.

The 321st were put on the left along the coast road, did a right wheel toward the ridge and came up against it on a broad front, gaining perhaps two or three hundred yards up the north slopes before being halted, still short of the crests, on the evening of 24 September. The airfield was in operation by this time, but potentially dangerous to operate; the Japs could have brought it under mortar and artillery fire from their ridge but for some strange reason failed to do so, although mechanics on the field were occasionally hit by snipers. The same kind of fire in another direction made it difficult to keep the 321st supplied along the coast road.

This brought about a recast of strategy at a headquarters conference on the morning of 25 September. The new plan was to pass Col Harris' 5th Marines through the rear areas of the 321st along the beach, cut easterly along the northern ridges of Bloody Nose and come back south on the rear of the enemy while sending a detachment to clear Ngesebus. The order was issued telephonically at 0945: Col Harris did a nice feat of marching and by noon was already pouring his troops into line. The drive of the 5th proved the key move: the regiment got heavy mortar fire in its lines from Ngesebus during the night and had quite a few casualties but, attacking at dawn of 26 September, slammed right across the ridges at the north end of the island, while the Army men reached the crest line. The 5th had, in fact, moved so rapidly that the now faltering Japanese organization lacked time to register its fires on them, and by night they had rounded the whole upper tip of the island. The enemy reacted with what were doubtless supposed to be local counterattacks but which were in effect Banzai charges, poorly made and costly to them.

NGESEBUS REMAINED; the 3d Battalion, 5th, took it on the 28th in a shore-to-shore operation with amphtracs followed by 16 tanks. There was now only one group of Japs remaining, but it was a big group, still well established in that middle section of Bloody Nose which overlooked the airfield, and still well led by Nakagawa,

*They had taken ten defended coral ridges, three large blockhouses with three guns or more apiece and shellproof coverings, 144 caves, 22 pillboxes, 13 antitank guns—or about a third of the island's armament. It took over four regiments to take the rest.

whose CP was very deep in. Clearing it out was a process of advance by inches over the precipitous ridges, sealing up the entrances of caves, from which the Japs occasionally escaped later. On the night of 1 February, 1945 in fact, five of them dug themselves out of one entrance and went on the warpath, which gives an idea.

On 12 October the island was declared secure, mainly in order to draw a line, but fighting was still going on, a whole month later an Army colonel was instantly killed by a sniper as he stepped from a transport on the airfield. There was still cave-sealing for the men of the 81st to do when they relieved the last of the 1st Marine Division troops on 26 October. The show had been worth the Presidential Unit Citation.

## V

By this time Gen Rupertus' command was pretty well worn out, with 6,265 casualties, or more than one man in every three of the division, after what was undoubtedly the hardest single fight of the war, harder than Tarawa and more prolonged. Whether it needed to have been quite so hard is something of a question. Certainly Inoue was by far the best Japanese commander the Marines had yet encountered. His plan of defense was admirably adapted to the ground and to his means, and he had been granted time to set it up as he wished, which is something Saito on Saipan did not have.

There were defects in the plan, to be sure. The guns and mortars in his positions fired continually on the thoroughly bad system of special assignments for each piece. An American tank group, for instance, would be ignored by a gun that had been assigned to fire on planes or infantry. Even when the Jap guns did shoot, they never thought of putting down a concentration in our sense of the term, but would fire three or four shots and then quit, which amounts to harassment rather than employing artillery for effect. The error in assuming that the Americans must assault the southern tip of Peleliu has been mentioned. The counterattack to the beach on the afternoon of the landing, though the most serious our men had to face since the Battle of Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal, really stood very little chance of success—partly because of the military shortcomings of the outnumbered Japanese tanks, to be sure, but even more because it was a violation of the very principles Inoue had laid down in the "Palau Sector Group Training for Victory." It was delivered into the teeth of fire from sea and shore, not by small groups crawling forward, but concentrated bodies of men running, who made admirable targets.

But to say that there were flaws in their arrangements is no more than to say that no military plan is perfect, and that under the fierce pressure of such a battle any mistakes in arrangements previously made will be laid bare. On the whole Inoue planned soundly and flexibly, fought the kind of battle he wanted to and presented our forces with the worst problem they had yet encountered. It is also to be noted that the problem was solved; the Marines had 1,241 dead, the Japs had 11,000 and lost their island.

But the question does remain whether there might not have been fewer Marine dead, whether the place might have been taken by the expenditure of more intelligence and less muscle. Without doubt the dominating ridge north of the airfield had to be taken and taken quickly. The division chose to land the bulk of its troops south of the ridge opposite the flat ground of the island. This was to make room for the tanks, artillery, and supply points necessary to support the attack against the ridge. This was done and in the doing 1900 Japs were cut off and destroyed south of the airfield.

Would the all-important ridge have fallen more quickly and with less cost had the bulk of the division been thrown directly against it from the northwest beaches? Here, 200 to 300 yards inland, the central ridge rises abruptly from the coastal flat. Puller's 1st, reinforced by a battalion of the 7th, found the going against this ridge tough, slow, and costly. There is no guarantee that two regimental combat teams would have had sufficient momentum to carry across the ridge. If they had failed, the division would have been in an unpleasant situation with no room to deploy its artillery and tanks and with its supply beaches dominated at close range by the enemy-infested ridge. There was also the matter of the 1900 Japs who would not have been cut off south of the airfield and who would have been available to assist in manning the ridge positions. There appears to have been no easy way!

Of course, there was not enough muscle for the operation in any case, regardless of how it was employed. The 1st Marine Division contained 9,000 combat infantry and given the conditions under which the Japanese fought, they had well over 10,000 effective infantrymen, which left our forces with nowhere near the necessary superiority against fortifications. There is also the fact that the naval gunfire was nowhere near sufficient quantitatively, nor had it done the damage the naval officers thought, and there was some Marine indignation about this later.

The final footnote to the desperate, costly campaign was furnished just the day before the tired Marines reembarked for Pavuvu—under a red twilight far to the west, where the remnants of the Imperial Japanese Navy were fleeing from the fatal waters from Cape Engano to Surigao, where three-quarters of the national sea forces had gone down. The Navy was done; the landings on Leyte were secure; and it would not have been necessary to take Peleliu after all. But of course no one could know that beforehand.

to be continued

# New Navy Planes

Navy's newest 600mph-plus jet carrier fighter is test flown over Grumman factory at Long Island.

Newest Navy amphibian, the Grumman twin-engined Albatross, is capable of operating on rough seas.



Navy Mercator patrol plane has two reciprocating and two jet engines giving it speed up to 350mph.

**Grumman "Panther" . . .**

THE NAVY RECENTLY TOOK THE SECRECY WRAPS OFF the latest in carrier fighters. Still in an experimental stage, the Grumman XF9F-2 Panther is powered by the most powerful production jet engine in the world. It has already been test flown successfully and is rated as a "better than 600 mph" aircraft.

The Panther is the first jet fighter to be developed by Grumman, producers of a long line of successful Navy fighters including the war-famous Wildcats and Hellcats.

It is the first jet fighter to be designed for either of two engines. This will insure an uninterrupted engine supply and will tend to reduce production costs. Interchange of engines can be accomplished in the field or operational units in a routine manner.

The first experimental model of the XF9F-2 is powered by a Rolls Royce "Nene" turbo-jet, developed by the British and to be manufactured in this country by Pratt & Whitney. The second experimental plane will be similarly equipped, but the third will have an Allison Model 400 (J-33) turbo-jet. Subsequent production models will be divided about evenly between the two engines. Although not identical, the Nene and the J-33 will be interchangeable in the Panther because of special installation facilities.

The XF9F-2 has the traditional Grumman square-tipped wings which fold for shipboard stowing. New construction features include a highly functionalized cockpit and a movable leading edge. Known as the "droop snoot" this new leading edge moves in conjunction with the wing flaps in landing and taking off and provides better stalling characteristics and added lift.

The cockpit is considered the closest approach by any

Navy fighter to the ideal established by Naval medical studies as to the physical and psychological requirements of a pilot.

For overhaul and inspection, one flip of a lever allows the whole nose section to be removed. The tail section can be detached in less than three minutes. Provisions have been made to include a pilot ejection escape mechanism in the production version.

### Grumman "Albatross" . . .

A NEW AND RUGGED AMPHIBIAN UTILITY PLANE, THE Grumman XJR2F Albatross, has been successfully tested and is ready for production. The new plane is designed for rough-water operation on the open sea, in rescue work, personnel or cargo transport, or multi-engine seaplane training. The product of extensive hydrodynamic research, it incorporates more freedom from "porpoising" and instability in rough water than any other plane of comparable design. It is expected to operate in waves as high as four and one-half feet.

The Albatross has a crew of three: pilot, co-pilot, and navigator-attendant, and can carry 14 passengers or 16 litter cases. Its cargo capacity is 4100 pounds. The plane cruises at 225 mph and has a top of 270. Its range varies from 600 miles, when heavily loaded with rescued personnel, to 1400 miles as a cargo hauler. It can be ferried up to 2600 miles.

A hatch, 58 by 63 inches, is built into the overhead to facilitate cargo loading. Rescue operations are effected through a "dutch" door in the side which is split horizontally.

Equipped with a tricycle landing gear, the big amphibian has a wingspan of 80 feet, is 61 feet, four inches long, and 24 feet, five inches high. It is powered by two Wright R-1820-76 engines of 1425 horsepower, and equipped with Hamilton Standard three-bladed propellers. Particularly desirable in rescue work will be the 12-second water take-off expected with the use of JATO units.
units.

### Martin "Mercator" . . .

THE MARTIN "MERCATOR" IS A REVOLUTIONARY TYPE patrol plane which combines two jet and two reciprocating engines to gain unusual flight characteristics. The P4M-1 or Mercator, which has been undergoing extensive testing since the first experimental flights a year ago, is powered by two R-4360-4 conventional engines of 3000 HP each and two Allison J-33-4 jets, each capable of 4000 pounds of thrust. The jet engines are mounted to the rear of the reciprocating engines in the wing nacelles.

The combined engines give the new plane a cruising speed of 200 mph and a top speed in excess of 350 mph. Maximum range is over 3000 miles.

The name Mercator was proposed by the Glenn L. Martin Company and approved by the Navy because of its close association with navigation. The P4M-1 will be capable of carrying out long over-water flights on search and reconnaissance missions, and is equipped with the latest radio and radar equipment available to make it an effective patrol plane.

### Marine Helicopter Squadron . . .

THE MARINES' FIRST HELICOPTER SQUADRON, HMX-1, under the command of Col Edward C. Dyer, was recently commissioned at MCAS, Quantico. The function of the squadron is primarily experimental. The helicopters being used are the four passenger Sikorsky HO3S-1 and the Piasecki HRP-1, which can carry a crew of two, plus eight passengers, or a ton of useful load.

The "HO" designation indicates "helicopter observation," while "HR" designates "helicopter transport." Pilots and mechanics for the new squadron received their training at the Navy's VX3 squadron, NAS, Lakehurst, N. J. In addition, some of the mechanics have had additional maintenance training at the Sikorsky and Piasecki plants.

The principal assets of the "Flying Pinwheels" are their capabilities for vertical ascent and descent, stationary flight, and maneuverability forwards, backwards, and sideways. They are slow (about 100 mph) but this is an advantage in that a helicopter can "feel its way" over terrain through poor visibility conditions which would hamper conventional aircraft. They are expected to be of great use in liaison, observation, vital supply transport, and evacuation of wounded. US MC



**The Marine Corps helicopter squadron at Quantico, Va., is equipped with this Piasecki Model XHRP-1.**

# Sea Power and the Balanced Fleet

By LtCol James D. Hittle

SEA POWER AS A CONCEPT IS NOTHING NEW TO military thought. The forceful application of sea power by the balanced fleet is not only something relatively new, but it is a purely American contribution to the conduct of modern war.

Capt Alfred Thayer Mahan, U. S. Navy, the greatest naval thinker of modern times, devoted a large portion of his professional life to convincing this nation of the validity of his concept of sea power as a fundamental feature of the sound military thinking upon which the overall security doctrine of the United States must be based. Contrary to so much that is now carelessly written about "sea power," Mahan considered sea power to be much more than the combat vessels of the fleet. He viewed a nation's sea power as every aspect of national life that contributed to ultimate control of the seas—social conditions, economy, geography, politics, merchant marine, and the nation's navy. All this, Mahan postulated, influenced the ultimate ability of a nation to control the seas.

While the geographical, political, sociological and political considerations were fundamentally important, actual achievement of superior power at sea—control of the sea—depended, according to Mahan, finally on the strength of the nation's fleet. The fleet was the punitive counterpart to non-military features of sea power, and consequently the fleet was the means for effecting the forceful application of sea power.

Sea power as a concept is no innovation to warfare, but the means by which our national sea power is forcefully applied is a unique and, from the historical standpoint, an American contribution to modern war method. Our fleet today comprises surface, subsurface, naval aviation, and naval landing forces. In its basic structure the fleet is well proportioned, possessing its own organic types of forces to permit accomplishment of any combat mission incident to achieving or exercising control of the seas. No individual element of naval power is emphasized to the exclusion of any other necessary component. The air, surface, subsurface and landing force components of the fleet are recognized to play a vital role in applying naval power; each is provided for in significant strength, with the result that the capabilities and limitations of each of the functional components of the fleet are considered in relation to each other as well as to the overall requirements of naval war. The term balanced fleet denotes an organizational concept, the fundamental feature of which is the inclusion within the fleet of all functional components to permit the fleet to conduct any type of operation incident to the prosecution of a naval campaign, involving, as it may, the coordinate employment of surface, subsurface, naval air and naval landing forces. Command, organization, and composition of forces of a balanced fleet are appropriately oriented in accordance with the predominantly naval character of the operations. Each functional component of the fleet is employed according to its capabilities for the purposes of achieving the final objective—command of the sea.

In keeping with this concept, surface or subsurface vessels do not engage the enemy merely to fight a surface action; landing forces do not assault a beachhead solely to fight a land battle; neither do air units strive for air supremacy over the disputed sea area or its shores merely for the sake of air supremacy in itself. All action on, below, and over the sea, as well as landing operations, when conducted as operations incident to a naval campaign, are reciprocally supporting and contribute to the attainment of the mutual naval objective. The balanced fleet provides all the basic tools needed for the conduct of a series of naval operations comprising the naval campaign.

THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN is a series of operations predominately naval in character. Such a campaign is usually conducted over a relatively large water area, and may involve separate air, surface, or subsurface combat; some or all of the operations that comprise a naval campaign may involve the coordinate employment of the various functional naval components—air, submarine, surface, and landing force. In the conduct of war on a hemispheric or global scale control of such land and water areas as are seized by means of naval campaigns serves a two-fold purpose: It denies freedom of such waters to the enemy, ultimately severing such enemy sea routes as traverse the area; when sufficient bases have been seized and command of sufficient sea areas is

**America was the first nation to integrate the principal means of fighting the varied but intimately related sea, land, and air battles involved in the naval campaign. Aviation and an effective landing force are as essential as ships**

achieved it ultimately facilitates the further projection of air or land forces against the enemy.

Technological advances since the days of sail have not materially altered the principle that control of sea areas is dependent upon possession of necessary base facilities. With the geographical character of the earth's surface being such that water and land areas are alternating in location, it is obvious that the control of water areas is dependent on terrestrial bases which may be either insular or littoral in character. For instance: In the Pacific, possession of key islands permits control of the various water areas operationally remote from the Asiatic or American mainland. Pacific water areas bordering the mainlands are controlled largely by bases on the Asiatic or American littoral.

Regardless of how effectively air, surface, or subsurface forces may be in defeating enemy forces within a sea area, control of such a sea area will remain largely transitory until such time as the land base governing the area is seized and exploited. The naval campaign, therefore, is the means by which naval force is applied to effect the desired control of water areas, usually by seizure of critical base areas.

World War II, waged on a global scale, presented many examples of the naval campaign. The operations incident to the seizure of the Marianas provided an illustration of such a campaign. Prior to the assault on the Islands, naval air, surface, and submarine forces engaged in operations designed to achieve freedom of movement across the waters surrounding the Marianas. Such naval actions came to a climax with the large scale air, surface and land battles, by which Japanese naval forces lost command of those waters. Continuation of the naval campaign, initially involving surface, submarine, and carrier forces, required the further application of naval power by seizure of necessary bases in the Marianas Islands. The naval campign culminated with the assault and capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Landing forces in each instance were under overall naval command, emphasizing the primacy of naval interest in such operations. Development of the Marianas bases permitted consolidation of control of the surrounding waters. It also provided the bases from which subsequent forces were projected against enemy strongholds of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and permitted establishment of long-range bomber bases within range of the Japanese mainland.

The operations leading up to and including the assault and seizure of the Marianas illustrate the predominately naval character of such a series of operations, conducted for the purpose of achieving control of a major sea area. Command and organization of forces involved in the Marianas naval campaign were in consonance with the nature of the operation. Naval forces gained freedom of the necessary sea approaches by a series of aggressive submarine, surface and air actions. Although Army units comprised a sizable portion of the landing forces used in the Marianas, the inclusion of Army troops within the landing force organization did not alter the character of such operations as those Army units were subject to overall naval command and operated in accordance with the amphibious doctrine applicable to fleet marine force units.

Thus in the Marianas naval campaign, as in the naval campaigns in the Solomons, the Gilberts, and the Marshalls, the inherently naval character of such operations was reflected in the organization of forces involved. A balanced fleet, under naval command, provided the principal means for fighting the varied but intimately related sea, land and air battles involved in the prosecution of a naval campaign.

It is noteworthy that this nation should be the first to evolve and apply the concept of the balanced fleet. Although such a concept is peculiarly appropriate to the geographical character of the United States, this nation is by no means the only one whose geographical position has accentuated naval aspects of national security.

ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES have been prominent maritime powers of the modern western world. England, whose wealth emanated from the mercantile system, which in turn has been historically dependent upon control of the seas, has never forgotten her dependence on freedom of the seas. Accordingly, from the days of Drake and Hawkins, England's military thinking has been oriented toward assurance of maintaining or sharing with an ally the control of the seas. As conscious as England has been of her dependence on control of the sea, there has been an historic tendency for her to consider surface and subsurface vessels as the tangible expression of naval power.

For a nation whose existence in the modern world has depended on freedom of the seas, England has evidenced a surprising disinclination or reluctance to rationalize sea power, the very thing upon which British survival rested. It remained for Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in the last decade of the 19th Century, to pre-

sent a thorough rationalization of sea power. Such a confession was made by no less an authority than Lord Sydenham, who in commenting on Mahan's work, wrote that "for the first time we had a philosophy of sea power built upon history from the days of the Punic Wars." Perhaps this failure to analyze for themselves the exact nature of sea power might be a contributory factor in the failure of the British military policy to demonstrate that the forceful application of sea power could involve more than the line of ships.

There have been periods in British naval history when it seemed that the British were on the verge of creating a balanced fleet. Before the days of the submarine and airplane, a balanced fleet would have required two basic components, the surface force, comprising combat and transport vessels, and a landing force integrated into naval organization and subject to naval command.

From early times England's fleet has been a power on the world's seas. But in spite of her dependence upon the fleet England's naval organization never quite reached the stage of development that would have given the Royal Navy its permanent counterpart of our present fleet marine forces.

The Royal Marines were founded in 1664 when a regiment for sea service was authorized by Charles II. There were times during the next century when British naval organization came extremely close to realizing what we know as fleet marine forces. As British fleets swept the seas in the late 17th and 18th century, naval power was the key to freedom of the seas and expansion of the Empire. Control of distant waters required squadrons on remote stations and those squadrons required bases. Then, as now, seizure of land areas was essential to expanded control of the seas. It was a naval function to seize such land areas as would facilitate control of adjacent waters, and as the Lords of the Admiralty should have realized, such fleet operations were predominently naval in character. Today we can see that those operations had many attributes of what are now known as naval campaigns.

One particularly close approach to creation of fleet marine forces was made in 1704 when Adm Rook of the Royal Navy seized Gibraltar, destined for centuries to be the symbol of British power. In that historic operation Royal Marines comprised a sizable part of the landing forces.

Following Rook's seizure of Gibraltar, there was a discernible tendency within the Royal Navy to associate Marines with landing operations. Such a trend was further manifested in 1740 when two regiments of infantry (Army) and six regiments of marines were raised for service as landing forces with ViceAdm Vernon in the Caribbean. Had the government in London sensed the logic of making Vernon's expedition an all-naval one, as was so clearly justified by the nature of the contemplated operations, and by the preponderance of Marines in the landing forces, England would have been in possession of a balanced fleet. Never had such an organizational concept been more appropriate to naval operations.

Vernon, a man of no mean ability, sailed for the New World intent on wresting the Caribbean from Spanish domination and adding it to the expanding British Empire. Control of the Caribbean area was to be achieved by a combination of surface engagements and landing operations for the purpose of capturing the land bases, control of which facilitated command of the Caribbean waters. From the standpoint of objective as well as method, Vernon's contemplated Caribbean endeavors had all the basic characteristics of a true naval campaign. But as events wore on, and anticipated victories turned into failure, we can see that the organization of Vernon's expeditionary forces was not appropriate to prosecution of a naval campaign.

Vernon's first major operation was against Puerto Bello. This was, fortunately, primarily a surface action. Puerto Bello was the first and last victory of Vernon's expedition. Several months were to intervene before the arrival of the transports carrying the military landing forces. Cathcart, the designated military commander, died soon after arrival in the Caribbean, and command went to a Gen Wentworth. Relations between Gen Wentworth and Adm Vernon became increasingly acrimonious. The intense animosity of the naval and military commanders was openly manifested at Cartagena and was in no small degree responsible for the sour manner in which that operation turned out for the British.

Vernon's Caribbean enterprise finally foundered on the rocks of dissension in the spring of 1742. Vernon, the admiral, proposed to attack Panama. Wentworth, the military commander, didn't like the proposal. The impasse was broken by a council of war, consisting of three military officers (of which Wentworth was one) and two naval officers.

THE COUNCIL OF WAR adopted Wentworth's views by a vote of 3-2, strictly along service lines. Vernon and RearAdm Sir Chaloner Ogle were the minority, and in accordance with the procedure of times "Vernon could do nothing but acquiesce."

The account of Vernon's Caribbean expedition points to significant and inescapable conclusions. The contemplated operations were predominantly naval in character. The preponderance of Marines in the accompanying military forces could well have been interpreted as justifying an organizational structure in harmony with and at the same time emphasizing the naval character of the operations. Vernon's acquiescence to a council of war did not indicate that unquestioned command rested with the naval commander. To put it another way:

clearly Vernon's Caribbean enterprise had the basic characteristics of a naval campaign. Just as clearly, neither the organizational structure of the forces involved nor the method of command was appropriate to the prosecution of a naval campaign. Such incongruities could not have existed if Vernon's forces had been organized in accordance with what we know today as the concept of the balanced fleet.

Certainly, there were other factors that exercised some influence on Vernon's ultimate failure, but they were contributory rather than determinant. Had Vernon possessed a landing force, integrated into the organization of his fleet in a manner similar to fleet marine forces, previously trained to operate with the fleet, and subject to unquestioned naval command, the story of Vernon's expedition to the Caribbean might read much differently. Indeed, it is interesting to speculate as to what would have been the course of American history if Vernon had possessed a balanced fleet, and as a consequence, gained victories at Cartagena, Panama, and Santiago, Cuba. With the Union Jack flying over those strategic localities, the Caribbean, like the Mediterranean, would in all probability have become a "British Lake." It would have taken more than a charge of Rough Riders and a one-sided naval engagement to break the grip of British power in the Caribbean.

After Vernon's return from the Caribbean, sizable Marine units continued to be employed intermittently as landing forces in the British fleets. But never again were circumstances to be more favorable for adoption of the balanced fleet concept than during Vernon's operations in the Caribbean. The tendency of the Royal Navy to use Marines for landing purposes was obviously not the result of any conscious policy. In fact, a trend in the opposite direction seemed evident by the middle of the 18th century. In 1756 RearAdm Byng, preparatory to sailing for Minorca, took aboard a regiment of Royal Fusiliers intended for use as a landing force. To make room for the Fusiliers he had to put ashore all the marines in his squadron. The Royal Navy did not comprehend the potential value of the Marines who were already part of naval organization. Neither did the Lords of the Admiralty realize how reasonable and appropriate it would have been to utilize Marines as the naval landing force of the fleets.

The wisdom of such a logical procedure escaped the makers of British policy, but it did not escape the greatest British military writer of the times, Gen Henry Lloyd. Now recognized as England's "first national writer on strategy," Gen Lloyd, quite paradoxically, spent his soldiering career in other than England's armies.

Lloyd, a veteran soldier of fortune in the land-power armies of Prussia, France, and Austria, did not, as did so many continental military leaders, permit his military thinking to become land-locked. Perhaps more than any Englishman of his generation, Lloyd understood the nature of British dependency on control of the seas, and of even more significance, he realized that Britain's dependence on naval power created the need for a peculiar type of naval organization that would allow maximum exploitation of that naval power.

Lloyd, writing in 1779, proposed that proper use of the Marines was the key to British power. For England the maritime nation, he observed: "Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectively." He further observed that a fleet with sufficient marines "is equal to any enterprise against the enemy's settlements and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world." "A powerful fleet and 30,000 marines will save us from destruction and nothing else."

It does not require any involved interpretation to appreciate that Lloyd, by referring to "any enterprise against the enemy's settlements," involving employment of a fleet with sufficient marines, was actually writing about what we would now call a naval campaign, conducted by a fleet possessing its own fleet marine forces. Indeed "a fleet and 30,000 marines" was Lloyd's 18th century formula for a balanced fleet. England could well have heeded Lloyd's admonition.

Lloyd's advice had no visible effect on the thinking of those who were charged with the formulation of policy for England's armed forces. In the course of England's subsequent history there were other occasions when, as in Vernon's Caribbean operations, England seemed to be on the verge of adopting the balanced fleet as a fundamental feature of her sea power, but on each such occasion the balanced fleet was rejected and the only instrument for the forceful application of British sea power continued to be ships of the Royal Navy.

HAVING FAILED to integrate naval landing forces into the structure of the fleets, British naval power was without the experience or theoretical background capable of indicating the manner in which aircraft should be incorporated into the organization of her naval establishment. At least officially, England failed to recognize that aircraft could be just as much a component of the fleets as were the surface or subsurface vessels. As in the case of landing forces in the days of sail, the Royal Navy in the 20th century failed to realize that the instruments of naval power were more than the ships of the fleet. Consequently, prior to World War II the air weapon never became a major combat element of the Royal Navy.

As a consequence, England at the beginning of World War II possessed powerful fleets of ships, but the fleets did not possess the landing forces or the powerful combat aviation forces that were so indispensible to the realization of true naval power. On the outbreak of

World War II the end result of centuries of British naval history was that England, because of her historical disinclination to incorporate major landing forces or air combat forces into naval organization in sufficient amount to complement the waterborne components of the navy, entered the War without a balanced fleet. For this failure, England paid dearly. As Secretary of National Defense Forrestal has pointed out, "the consequence of this neglect was that the British went into the war with a totally inadequate naval airforce." The sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* did not end the disasters that befell England because of her failure to possess a balanced fleet.

The German invasion of Norway presented England with the opportunity to exploit her sea power in the defense of Norway, and in so doing to give the Germans an important and sound defeat. Tactically and strategically, reaction to the German threat in Norway was dependent on naval power—the ability to wage a naval campaign against the Norwegian coast. Again the lack of a powerful naval air force had an immediate and unfavorable effect on the conduct of the British operations. From the practical standpoint the British initiated operations against the German forces in Norway without benefit of naval air cover. But British deficiencies in naval power did not stop with the absence of naval air forces. In keeping with historical precedent, England, on the eve of the Norwegian campaign, lacked the specially trained landing forces so necessary to extending the striking force of the fleet against land objectives.

Because England's naval power did not possess a readily available fleet marine force, 16,000 troops without adequate amphibious training were dispatched as a landing force against the Norwegian coast. Unprepared for an amphibious mission as a part of the conduct of a naval campaign, the landing force failed in its mission. In short, the Royal Navy was short on both naval air forces and naval landing forces similar to our fleet marine forces. England did not possess a balanced fleet, and consequently England lost Norway.

The lesson of the failure of the British naval campaign against Norway has been succinctly summarized by Secretary Forrestal: "This disaster, which profoundly affected the course of the entire war, was more than the failure of 16,000 men, but was a failure in the exercise of sea power on the part of the then largest navy in the world. and it was entirely due to the lack of a small, specially trained amphibious force such as we have in the form of the United States Marines, to supplement ashore the action of the fleet at sea."

The naval traditions of the United States have their origins in the Royal Navy. The early naval thought of the U.S. Navy was closely akin to British thinking, so it was not strange that when U. S. Marines were first organized in 1775 they were employed largely in the manner in which the Royal Marines had been used by the Royal Navy. From their inception the U. S. Marines were associated with naval functions, seeing service as part of ships companies, at naval establishments ashore, and as landing parties in connection with naval attacks of shore positions. Such employment was no departure from British precedent.

During the hundred-odd years that intervened between the Revolution and the Spanish American War, marines participated in numerous landing operations. Used principally in conjunction with sailors to form a landing party or as part of a larger landing force composed largely of army troops, marines continued to be employed according to European precedent. Until the end of the 19th century there was little or no indication that this nation saw the need for integrating landing forces into the structure of the fleet. The United States Navy was no closer to the realization of the need for a balanced fleet than was England.

IN THE LAST DECADE of the 19th century two things happened that were to have a profound and lasting affect on the future naval development of this nation. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote *The Influence of Sea Power on History* (copyrighted 1890) and the United States went to war against Spain. The war against Spain was the conflict of a decadent Empire against a young and vigorous nation feeling the irresistable urge of a "manifest destiny." It was a war of a nation of the old world against a nation of the new world. As such it was an intercontinental war involving both hemispheres. The Spanish-American War, coupled with Mahan's rationalization of sea power, brought home to the American people the realization of how dependent they were upon command of the sea.

Mahan's writing did not discuss fleet marine forces or what we now know as the concept of the balanced fleet. But he did speak of the exercise of sea power on a global scale and he continually emphasized the need for bases. The war with Spain underlined the validity of his thinking, and demonstrated the need for the naval organization required for the forceful application of sea power. The balanced fleet today may well be considered both as a logical extension and application of the thinking of Mahan, and as a practical outgrowth of the War with Spain. The writings of Mahan provided the theoretical basis for the intelligent solution of the naval problems created by this nation's emergence from the Spanish American War as a leading naval power.

The United States became a great sea power by virtue of the defeat of the Spanish Empire. And with this victory over Spain came a new and greater appreciation of the role of landing forces, and the necessity for integrat-

ing such landing (or expeditionary forces as they were called) within the structure of the fleet. The efficient assault and seizure of the advanced fleet base at Guantanamo by a battalion of marines stood out in bold relief against the background of confusion that characterized the efforts to get Shafter's troops ashore at Siboney. The value of landing forces within the naval organization was demonstrated at Guantanamo and it was readily recognized by those who exercised naval command in the Cuban waters. Landings on the South coast of Cuba provided abundant opportunity to compare and contrast the landing efficiency of troops accustomed to normal land warfare and those, such as the Marine Battalion at Guantanamo, accustomed to the sea and the requirements of naval command. Adm Sampson soon recognized the asset he possessed in the Marine Battalion. It is reported that on 3 July, 1898, when the Spanish fleet finally emerged, Sampson was actually on his way to inform Gen Shafter that if he wasn't able to dispose of the Spanish batteries commanding the entrance to Santiago, he (Sampson) would bring up the Marine Battalion and do it.

The Spanish American War's demonstrated need for fleet marine forces was readily recognized by those who understood the character and requirements of a naval campaign. The following quotations indicate the extent to which naval thought appreciated the need for landing forces within the structure of the fleet:

Adm Dewey: "If there had been 5,000 marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned."

RearAdm George H. Converse, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, commented on October 31, 1906, concerning "the recognized value of marines for manning the naval bases in our insular possessions and for service as expeditionary forces in emergencies needing prompt response."

RearAdm John E. Pillsbury, while Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in 1908, stated that the Marines "should be organized into regiments, battalions and companies, and should be embarked, or ready to embark in a suitable vessel, and should be attached to the fleets, thus forming part of the fighting force of the fleet directly under the commander-in-chief."

RearAdm Robley D. Evans stated that the Marines should be organized as "an expeditionary force, under naval regulations and discipline, and their number increased, say, 20,000 . . ." Writing further, in 1909, regarding the employment of Marine expeditionary forces, RearAdm Evans outlined a proposed general procedure for the conduct of fleet landing exercises to take place "three or four times a year."

MARINES CONTINUED to see the logic of the employment of expeditionary forces as part of the fleet. In 1908 MajGenComdt George F. Elliott invited attention to the "absolute necessity for . . . transports for the sole and exclusive use of the Marine Corps." In 1912 MajGenComdt William P. Biddle again commented on the need for proper transports for expeditionary forces. Gen Biddle accurately visualized the nature of future fleet marine force establishments as he called for the adoption of "the policy of having at least one large post on each coast," for use of the expeditionary forces. His remarks of 18 December 1913 are particularly significant, in that he pointed to the necessity for maintaining sufficient marine forces for use in connection with a "naval campaign."

The above quotations are noteworthy in that they show clearly how our national naval thought adjusted itself to the problems involved in the conduct of a war on a global scale, as was the then-recent war with Spain. Expeditionary forces of marines were to be separate and distinct from the Marine detachments of the various ships, and as such these expeditionary forces were a definite departure from previous United States and British naval thought on the employment of marines. Almost coincident with this nation's emergence onto the world scene as a leading naval power, our high command recognized something that the British failed to learn in over two centuries of dependence on sea power—that employment of naval power in the exercise of a nation's sea power necessitated a fleet organization that provided the naval commanders with the necessary combat tools to wage a naval war. The United States after the Spanish American War, her first venture into war conducted on a global scale, readily recognized that the application of naval power by a maritime nation demanded that such naval power be predicated upon the concept of the balanced fleet.

**The Spanish-American War brought about a greater appreciation of the role of expeditionary troops, and the necessity for integrating such landing forces within the structure of the fleet. The Marine Battalion, accustomed to sea and land warfare, proved more efficient than ordinary land troops**

The period covering the last years of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century, an era dominated by the Spanish American War and the United States emergence as a naval power may well be termed "the era of amphibious awakening." Out of those years came the

new realization of a need for landing forces within the fleet. This made possible the balanced fleets that proved to be the key to victory in the Pacific in World War II.

World War I did not give this nation the opportunity to employ expeditionary forces in conjunction with major naval operations. Consequently, immediate postwar military thinking questioned the need for Marine expeditionary forces organized as functional components of the fleets. Those who may have doubted wisdom of maintaining Marine expeditionary forces received their answer on 13 March 1920, when MajGen John A. Lejeune, testified before House Naval Affairs Committee, and presented his views as to what he believed to be the proper functions of the Marine Corps in the future. Lejeune pointed out that World War I did not permit the Marine Corps to carry out its logical mission. This was, he explained, "due to the fact that we entered the war after the enemy fleet, except submarines, had been swept from the seas. Consequently, there was no naval mission for the Marine Corps, and unless it had served with the Army in France, the Marine Corps could not have taken any part in the great war." While recognizing the peculiar nature of World War I as it affected the utilization of fleet expeditionary forces, he emphasized the thought that future wars would not necessarily be in keeping with the patterns of the first World War.

THE NEED FOR Marine expeditionary forces ready for immediate service with the fleets, was clearly explained. Said Gen Lejeune "There is always the danger that the next war may burst upon us as suddenly as did the last war on England and France . . . As these expeditionary forces of marines are intended for service with the fleets, they must be kept in a similar state of readiness. The duty of the expeditionary forces with the fleets would be the seizure, occupation, fortification and defense of temporary naval bases. Fleets cannot operate without bases."

Lejeune's testimony went far toward clarifying thinking regarding the need for Marine expeditionary forces. Not only did he help reorient our naval thought to the logical requirements of a maritime nation, but the thoughts expressed in the testimony served as a blueprint for future employment of the Marine Corps, emphasizing its fundamental mission of providing landing forces for employment in naval war. His testimony regarding the employment of Marine naval landing forces was both prophetic and sound.

In 1933 the Marine landing forces recived the official and still effective designation of "fleet marine forces," an accurately descriptive term. Twenty-seven years after Gen Lejeune appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, and in that law Congress set forth the functions of the Marine Corps. The concept of the employment of Marine expeditionary forces (fleet marine forces) as visualized by Gen Lejeune is today embodied in the National Security Act of 1947.

Based upon the demonstrated willingness to consider landing forces as an integral component of naval power, there was no historical precedent in the U. S. Navy that prevented the airplane from being accepted along with the ships and landing forces as a functional component of naval power. In contrast to British naval thought and organization, the airplane was progressively developed and integrated into the structure of the United States naval forces. Early development of the catapult and the growth and versatility of the carrier emphasized the manner in which the airplane was accepted as a component of naval power. The airplane was recognized as a weapon capable of materially assisting in the struggle for control of the sea, and a combat instrument, particularly as in its later specialization for naval use, admirably suited for employment in extending the striking force of the fleet against enemy air, shipping, land targets and in conjunction with surface, subsurface, and landing forces in prosecution of a naval campaign.

Acceptance of landing forces and air units as components of naval power produced the balanced fleets that stopped the Japanese tide of victory at Guadalcanal, drove in the perimeter of Japanese Empire defenses at Bougainville, and struck aggressively across the central Pacific, finally gaining bases from which the Army Air Forces could bring the Japanese homeland under B-29 and fighter attack. Indeed, it may be said that the balanced fleet was the principal means by which the war in the Pacific was fought and won.

THE BALANCED FLEET was no accident in the development of our naval organization. Basically the balanced fleet is a distinct departure from previous, and particularly British, naval precedent. It is indeed fortunate that those who formulated this nation's naval policy were endowed with the vision, wisdom, and mental courage that permitted the United States to adopt the concept of the balanced fleet. By so doing, the makers of our naval policy gave this nation the naval organization tailored to fit the requirements of a maritime power, and as a consequence this nation was able to avoid the disasters that fell upon the British because of that nation's failure to adopt such a logical concept of naval organization. The ability of United States naval power to occupy Iceland on short notice and to strike with little preparation against Guadalcanal stands in sharp contrast against the failure of British naval power to respond successfully to similar requirements in Norway and Crete. The difference between British failure and United States success is explained principally by the fact that the British did not possess a balanced fleet. The United States did.

Acceptance of the concept of the balanaced fleet pro-

The Commandant of the Marine Corps desires to make general acknowledgement through the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE of the Christmas and New Year greetings received from friends of the Corps. Because of the number of messages received, he is unable to reply direct to each well-wisher. He therefor takes this means of conveying personal and official thanks to all, with cordial assurances of friendship.

vided the means by which the United States could most effectively apply its sea power. Effective application of sea power is still a fundamental consideration of national security. Strengthened by the increased combat capabilities of the air weapon, the last war clearly demonstrated that naval power provides the only reliable medium for gaining and maintaining control of ocean areas. Today, when even the need for any navy at all is being questioned at the highest military level, it is better to base our national defense doctrine upon demonstrated truths than upon the unsupported contentions of enthusiasts who deprecate naval power and claim the air weapon to be an independent instrument for achieving victory.

Our national naval power has utilized the air weapon, not as an independent force in itself, but as a weapon capable of assisting in gaining and maintaining control of the seas. As it is used in naval war, the airplane is an integral part of naval power, exploited to full advantage, its effort coordinated appropriately with other elements of the balanced fleet in the struggle to achieve a naval objective. No one component of naval power wins a naval campaign. It is the coordinate effort of all elements—landing force, air, and combat vessels—that constitutes the naval combat team known as the balanced fleet. As they exist as components of the balanced fleet, landing forces are not thought of as "land power," nor are naval air components identified as "air power"; neither are combat vessels considered synonomous with "sea power." Rather, each is a mutually supporting component of naval power, and as such finds its logical justification in the coordinate role it plays in the application of the nation's sea power.

As long as this nation continues to realize that sea power is an indispensible factor in national security, and as long as the balanced fleet is accepted as the most efficient means of effecting the forceful application of sea power, then, for that long, the existence of fleet marine forces (which in fact means the Marine Corps) and naval aviation is logically justified. Thus, the balanced fleet is reason for maintaining fleet marine forces and naval aviation as we know them today. It goes without saying that diminution or major alteration of the function of naval aviation will have an immediate affect on the status of fleet marine forces; conversely, a reduction or major modification of the function of fleet marine forces will have a similar affect on the status of naval aviation. Both have their *raison d'etre* in the concept of the balanced fleet. Neither are today logically justified without it

THE CONCEPT of the balanced fleet is probably more applicable to the future than the past. It was valid when only landing forces and surface vessels comprised a balanced fleet, and it has even more effectively demonstrated its applicability in the technologically advanced atmosphere of World War II. It will continue to be a factor of world strategy in peace or war. Future technological advances may well alter the present composition and technique of the balanced fleets required for the prosecution of a naval campaign. Greater emphasis will be placed upon naval combat aviation as a means of intensifying and extending the striking power of the fleet. Fleet marine forces of the future will place increasing importance upon air transport. Illustrative of the inherent versatility of the balanced fleets of the future, the increasing importance of air transportation for fleet marine forces may be equaled by the advances in the utilization of undersea craft for the transportation of such fleet marine forces.

Thus the concept of the balanced fleet, valid in the past and present, will continue to be justified in the future. Based upon such a guiding principle our naval power of the future should retain the characteristics of team-work, operational self-sufficiency, and the unexcelled strategic mobility that have come to be the intrinsic attributes of our progressive naval thought and action.

The balanced fleet has been accepted as a major feature of national security. The National Security Act of 1947 recognizes both naval aviation and fleet marine forces to be major elements of naval power, and the "naval campaign" is accorded legal recognition in this basic security legislation. In writing the National Security Act, Congress recognized our national dependence upon sea power and, by directing the maintenance of surface, subsurface, air, and landing force elements of naval power, made the concept of the balanced fleet a major feature of our national security.

Congress, in passing the National Security Act of 1947, recognized that the organization of our armed forces must be designed according to our peculiar needs as a maritime nation. As a consequence, Congress further recognized that the structure of our armed forces cannot be patterned according to continental European military thought nor based upon the purported combat self-sufficiency of any one type of weapon.

As long as such truths remain self evident, the security of this nation will in large measure continue to depend upon the forceful application of our sea power by the balanced fleet. US MC

TO THE EDITOR

# Message Center

**Liberty Uniforms . . .**

DEAR SIR:

In recent issues of your magazine there have been several letters commenting most disfavorably on the khaki jacket and I would like to cast my vote along with theirs. That, however, is not my primary "gripe" at present about the uniform situation. The CMC recently ordered that dress or undress blues would be the liberty uniform after the first of the year with the exception of a few summer months when we will be able to "unharness" and relax.

I like our dress uniforms very much and agree that they are a true symbol of the Corps, but not as a compulsory liberty uniform. I think the wearing of blues on liberty should be optional and the official use restricted to Corps activities and formations or formal outside occasions where more "dress" is required. In short, make it a dress uniform for dress occasions.

Another point I would like to mention is that whether we like it or not there is a number of those "characters" who are rowdy, troublesome, and overindulgent drinkers who invariably end up with their collar (and a button or two) unbuttoned, their belt off, and their hat on the back of their head. These people are just as readily recognized (if not more so) as marines as the one who conducts himself with proper decorum.

A large number of marines are planning to make "civvies" their liberty uniform when this order is effective. These men love the Corps and take pride in its history and traditions as I do. They just want to be comfortable on liberty—is that asking too much?

JAMES F. MILLS,
MSgt, USMC.

**More on uniforms . . .**

DEAR SIR:

Through the GAZETTE, the newspapers, letters of instruction, and other sources of official and unofficial information I have been doing my not-so-brilliant best to follow this uniform situation. The picture as I get it, is this:

About a year or so ago the Army decreed that after an indefinite date, enlisted men and officers would dress alike. This was, I believe, a concession to the caste-system critics. There was to be a blue dress uniform provided sometime in the fuzzy future, but during the interim the OD uniform would serve as both service and dress. The Army blouse was gradually replaced with the so-called Eisenhower jacket which the Army miscopied from the British battle jacket.

Shortly thereafter the Marine Corps straddled the fence by re-designing the green uniform and issuing the policy that officers with troops would wear the enlisted uniform. The design of the new service uniform broke a 170-year-old tradition and included hip pockets, thus tacitly admitting that enlisted men might have handkerchieves and wallets. About the same time the blue uniform underwent some slight modernization.

A few months ago President Truman went down to Brazil to talk to some people and was embarrassed by the drab (pun intended) appearance of our Army officers. Directives were issued post-haste for the Armed Forces to get their officers into an evening dress uniform.

Filled with the spirit of unification, the appointed board has come up with a recommendation that the Army, Air, and Navy adopt identical evening dress uniforms—tailcoat affairs distinguished only by facings and insignia.

Then someone remembered that the Marine Corps had an evening dress uniform. The GAZETTE printed a picture of it last month. There is also a scarlet-lined boat cloak which is worn with it. It is undoubtedly a beautiful uniform. It is also a super-expensive item. The mossbacks are pleading for its retention.

Admittedly, my prewar service was short, but in my seven years in the Marine Corps, I have seen the evening dress uniform worn exactly once and then by an embarrassed first lieutenant at a college dance.

I don't see why our blue uniform—the one the public considers to be our "dress" uniform—can't continue to serve as evening dress. Certainly it is distinctively Marine. If it is thought that something additional is needed to distinguish it from daytime dress, why not add detachable gold shoulder knots and a red and gold waist belt (similar to the dress cap straps)?

This would save money, save space, and provide an evening dress uniform which is unmistakably Marine Corps.

CAPT MOSSFREE

*Each month the* GAZETTE *will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested.*

### Administrative Illiterate . . .

DEAR SIR:

Although I probably am not the officer Maj Heinl had in mind (*Rising Tide of Administration,* January GAZETTE), I *am* a major and I *do* have to ask the sergeant major how to figure out my delay, proceed, and travel time, and I have seen officers two ranks above me do the same thing.

It came as no surprise to learn that I am an administrative illiterate—I've known it for some time. But I've been blaming my own laziness all along, without realizing that all the other administrative illiterates and I are bucking a trust. While I have no desire to become a member of the administrative caste, I do resent their possessive attitude toward the machinery which has such a direct effect on my own well-being. It wouldn't be so bad if the personnel constituting the trust were infallible, but they aren't—*that* much I've learned. For instance, my check from a certain wartime pay office began to look funny to me after a couple of months, so, with a stroke of genius and some simple arithmetic, I figured out that I was being shorted some fifty dollars per check. It turned out one of the staff sergeants couldn't add very well. This was doubtless an isolated case, and I was assured that such mistakes are eventually caught anyway, but I've never since signed a pay voucher without checking it carefully. And the same goes for any other item of administration which requires my signature.

One other thing Maj Heinl didn't mention (probably out of a sense of propriety) was the infuriating, condescending manner which many of the "high priests of paper magic" assume. During the war, more ill-feeling than is good to think about was caused by the testy tempers and rude manners of various personnel officers stationed along the feed lines to the advanced Pacific bases. Marines going both ways—fresh from the States with a bag full of dirty laundry and a natural curiosity about their future, or fresh from one of the divisions in hand-washed khaki and a "going-home" daze—were shunted around, glared at, snapped at, needlessly made to wait, and otherwise subjected to some pretty shabby treatment. And from what I've seen, this deplorable attitude didn't die out altogether when the Japanese surrendered.

And, finally, I should like to cast my vote for the restoration of company administration. I know that there are administrative arguments—all, perhaps, more or less valid—against it, but I feel that the close relationship between commander and command which results therefrom, and which cannot quite be duplicated by any other system, more than offsets the objections. As a wartime company commander, I felt at the time it was a good idea to have somebody else take care of my administration, but looking back, I realize that the company was never quite the same thereafter. Deprived of his record books, the first sergeant (or infantry chief, as he is now called) tends to become just another one of the boys; and the captain finds his men looking past him to the battalion office.

MAJ A. ILLITERATE





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### Brahmin defender . . .

DEAR SIR:

Judging from the tenor of Maj Heinl's article *Rising Tide of Administration* it appears that in an age devoted to atom bombs, guided missiles, jet propelled planes and other highly specialized weapons of war, the good major is losing sight of the fact that a "speciality" is the rule rather than the exception. The day of the "ol' time marine" who was a "Jack of all trades and a master of none" has ceased to exist. Why has classification been instituted?

It has been stated that the noncommissioned officer is the backbone of the Marine Corps and since most of the gripes of Maj Heinl seem to be aimed at the WO (Adm) who gained that title by emerging from the enlisted ranks by excelling in his profession it would seem that the article was prompted by personal feelings rather than a desire to get back to company administration for the good of the service.

But why select the administrators for this particular bombardment? Why not the Ordnance, Communications, Supply Service or other specialist branches? The idea of administration being something that everyone can do is passé. It requires special training for administrative matters, even though this training is "on the job" in a clerk capacity.

The return to company administration would only add to the administrators now in office.

CAPT JOSE BLEAU

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

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# Incident at Guadalcanal

WHEN THE MARINES OPENED THE FIRST OFFENsive of the war on Guadalcanal, they disrupted more than the enemy's plans. They threw a large and knotty kink into the way of life of a few score British and a good many thousand natives. The disruption began in 1942 when the first marine gave the first native his first American cigarette, and to this day the kink hasn't been straightened out.

When the Japanese began filtering down through the island chain in the spring of 1942, they did little to alter the lives of the natives save in the neighborhoods of the great copra plantations.

The Americans presented an entirely different picture. For the first time, the local people were brought into contact with the tremendous variety of foods and other physical comforts and mechanical gadgets that Western civilization has developed. Also for the first time, the native who did a day's work for the white man was paid what to him was a munificent wage. With this wage he could buy wonderful items in the post exchanges—and it became a commonplace occurrence to see the brown arm that held a Malaita warclub decorated with the latest thing in American wrist watches, or to see a shadowy brown figure on a dark jungle pathway stop, extract a cigarette from a neat case, and light it, with a nonchalant flick of the wrist, at the flame of a polished metal cigarette lighter.

One by one the great benefits of civilization were withdrawn. First, the war moved away to the northwestward, and an essentially warlike people returned to a life of enforced peace. Then, as the distant rumblings died away completely, and as the jungle began to nibble at the edges of the great airfields, the American forces began to dwindle and finally disappeared altogether. Copra began to assume its old importance, and the festive board in the village head man's house didn't groan quite as eloquently as it had. Rice and *kumara* replaced white bread and dehydrated vegetables, and the mephitic stick tobacco replaced the well-known American brands.

But in every jungle village on Guadalcanal, small dark individuals chanted *You are My Sunshine* at all hours; and on Malaita, the toughest and most intransigent of all the islands, the natives remembered the fat years and decided to go American in a big way.

In July of the past year a tiny news dispatch, emanating from Australia, told of an amphibious landing, in LC(O)s,* carried out by Malaitans against the small British post just west of Point Cruz, on Guadalcanal. Subsequently a story came from American aviators who had passed over the area, going into great detail about the organization of the force and its armament. The fire team was said to have included one blow pipe and one bow and arrow, with spears and warclubs as normal arms for the balance of the team. An interesting and reminiscent touch was given the account by the statement that the invaders were demanding 48 dollars per month pay, and more and better food. Exclusive bargaining rights were not mentioned.

Since the publication of the above items, there has been no confirmation from British sources. Individuals in the State Department are inclined to scout the story, while at the same time agreeing that there is a widespread native movement against the status quo. The latest word is that negotiations are taking place on a high level. JLZ

*Landing Craft (Outrigger)